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ABSTRACT:	We	re-analyse	the	1916	Battle	of	Jutland	(German:	Skagerrak),	the	major	naval	
engagement	of	the	First	World	War,	in	the	light	of	the	understanding	of	dreadnought	fleet	tactics	
developed	over	the	decade	leading	up	to	it.	In	particular,	we	consider	the	interaction	of	the	calculus	
of	Lanchester’s	Square	Law	with	fleet	geometry	and	the	commanders’	decisions	that	determined	it,	
and	with	the	shipbuilding	decisions	associated	with	the	Lanchestrian	trade-off	between	quality	and	
quantity.	We	re-examine	the	behaviour	of	the	commanders	in	the	light	of	this	tactical	analysis,	and	
conclude	that	the	outcome	of	Jutland,	in	spite	of	apparent	British	tactical	and	technological	failings,	
was	the	culmination	of	a	decade	of	consistent	and	professionally	insightful	decision-making	by	the	
Royal	Navy,	which	built	and	correctly	wielded	its	decisive	weapon,	the	Grand	Fleet,	to	achieve	the	
required	strategic	victory.	
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The	1916	Battle	of	Jutland	remains	a	subject	of	undiminished	controversy	as	its	centenary	
approaches.
1
	Much	of	this	debate	revolves	around	the	question	of	victory	and	defeat,	and	the	
performance	of	the	British	commanders,	Admiral	Jellicoe	and	Vice	Admiral	Beatty.	The	logical	
tension	created	by	a	rare	combination	of	strategic	victory	and	apparent	tactical	defeat	naturally	
defies	consensus.	On	the	one	hand	Jellicoe,	famously	the	only	man	on	either	side	who	could	lose	the	
war	in	an	afternoon,	was	equally	aware	that	he	could	not	win	it	in	the	same	time	span	and	receives	
praise	for	a	calculated	performance	that	maintained	Britain’s	naval	supremacy	despite	a	negative	
and	dispiriting	exchange	of	human	and	material	losses.	Conversely,	Jellicoe’s	apparently	un-British	
playing	of	the	percentages	is	contrasted	with	his	subordinate	Beatty’s	embrace	of	the	Nelsonian	
tradition	of	dash	and	daring,	which,	critics	argue,	could	have	delivered	a	crushing	and	unequivocal	
victory	to	Britain	at	a	pivotal	point	in	the	war.	The	emotional	edge	to	this	debate	is	fuelled	further	by	
the	addition	of	a	declinist	narrative,	which	places	Britain’s	dramatic	losses	of	capital	ships	in	the	
																																								 																				
1
	The	early	controversy	began	with	J.	E.	T.	Harper’s	Naval	Staff	Appreciation	(later	moderated	into	K.	G.	B.	and	
A.	Dewar,	Narrative	of	the	Battle	of	Jutland	(London,	1924)),	which,	following	interventions	by	Beatty,	was	
highly	critical	of	Jellicoe	(see	also	J.	E.	T.	Harper,	The	truth	about	Jutland	(London,	1927)	and	J.	E.	T.	Harper	and	
L.	Gibson,	The	Riddle	of	Jutland	(London	and	New	York,	1934)).		The	written	battle	raged	thereafter,	
exemplified	by	the	pro-Beatty	C.	Bellairs,	The	Battle	of	Jutland:	the	sowing	and	the	reaping	(London,	1920)	and	
the	pro-Jellicoe	Adm.	Sir	Reginald	Bacon,	The	Jutland	Scandal	(London,	1924.	The	definitive	history	is	A.	J.	
Marder,	From	the	Dreadnought	to	Scapa	Flow:	The	Royal	Navy	in	the	Fisher	era,	1904-1919,	5	vols	(Oxford,	
1961-1970).	For	accessible	modern	summaries	see	P.	Hart	and	N.	Steel,	Jutland	1916	─	Death	in	the	Grey	
Wastes	(London,	2003)	and	Eric	Grove,	‘The	memory	of	the	Battle	of	Jutland	in	Britain’,	in		M.	Epkenhans,	J.	
Hillmann,	F.	Nägler,	Skagerrakschlacht:	Vorgeschichte	─	Ereignis	─	Verarbeitung	(Munich,	2009),	translated	as	
Jutland:	World	War	I’s	greatest	naval	battle	(Lexington,	2015),	which	also	gives	current	German	perspectives.	
Regarding	our	title	we	note	that	Jellicoe	wrote	to	Churchill	on	14/7/1914	that	‘The	Germans	would	argue	that	
their	guns	are	of	sufficient	power	to	carry	their	projectiles	through	our	comparatively	weak	armour	[and]	it	has	
not	been	necessary	to	have	heavier	guns	hitherto.	I	do	not	agree	with	them	because	I	attach	so	much	
importance	to	weight	of	bursting	shell’.	A.	Temple	Patterson	ed.,	The	Jellicoe	Papers:	selections	from	the	
private	and	official	correspondence	of	Admiral	of	the	Fleet	Earl	Jellicoe	of	Scapa		(Navy	Records	Soc.,	vols	108	
and	111,	1966	and	1968),	vol.I,	item	31.		Fisher	was	typically	more	exclamatory:	‘After	all,	the	immense	
superiority	of	our	13.5“	guns	MUST	tell’	(Fisher	to	Jellicoe,	21/1/1915,	Jellicoe	Papers,	vol.1,	item	103).	
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context	of	a	perceived	ongoing	and	accelerating	industrial	and	institutional	failure,	particularly	
relative	to	Germany.
2
	
				Recent	work	has	tended	to	emphasize	either	technical	issues	or	command	and	control	within	the	
wider	context	of	the	Royal	Navy’s	organizational	culture.
3
	However,	from	one	crucial	perspective	
Jutland	has	yet	to	be	addressed.	Fifty	years	of	technical	development	of	capital	ships	had	been	
accompanied	by	scant	hard	evidence	concerning	how	best	to	use	them:	yet	fleet	tactics	had	to	be	
developed,	and	there	is	a	large	body	of	writing	on	the	topic	from	the	twenty	years	preceding	Jutland,	
almost	entirely	neglected	in	the	recent	resurgence	of	pre-First	World	War	naval	history.
4
	Its	central	
																																								 																				
2
	See,	for	example,	C.	Barnett,	The	Swordbearers:	Supreme	Command	in	the	First	World	War	(London,	1963).	
The	second	of	the	four	case	studies	in	the	book	is	‘Sailor	with	a	flawed	cutlass:	Admiral	Sir	John	Jellicoe’.	The	
thesis	is	critiqued	in	E.	Grove,	‘How	flawed	really	was	Britain’s	cutlass?	A	critique	of	the	Barnett	thesis’,	in	A.	
Clesse	and	C.	Coker,	The	Vitality	of	Britain	(Luxembourg,	1993).	For	a	recent	perspective	see	Shawn	T.	Grimes,	
Strategy	and	War	Planning	in	the	British	Navy,	1887-1918	(London,	2012).	
3
	A	substantial	body	of	work	by	Sumida	explores	various	aspects	of	the	use	of	this	rapidly-changing	technology,	
ranging	from	the	problem	of	fire	control	(J.	T.	Sumida,	‘British	Capital	Ship	Design	and	Fire	Control	in	the	
Dreadnought	Era:	Sir	John	Fisher,	Arthur	Hungerford	Pollen,	and	the	Battle	Cruiser’,	Journal	of	Modern	History,	
51	(1979),	pp.	205-230)	to	that	of	the	optimal	range	at	which	to	fight	(J.	T.	Sumida,		‘A	Matter	of	Timing:	The	
Royal	Navy	and	the	Tactics	of	Defensive	Battle,	1912-1916’,	Journal	of	Military	History,	67	(2003),	pp.	85-136),	
although	his	conclusions	are	disputed	(M.	Seligmann,	‘A	German	preference	for	a	medium-range	battle?	British	
assumptions	about	German	naval	gunnery,	1914-1915’,	War	in	History,	19	(2012),	pp.	33-48;	J.	Brooks,	
‘Preparing	for	Armageddon:	Gunnery	Practices	and	Exercises	in	the	Grand	Fleet	Prior	to	Jutland’,	Journal	of	
Strategic	Studies	36	(2015)	pp.	1006-1023;	Stephen	McLaughlin,	‘Battlelines	and	Fast	Wings:	Battlefleet	Tactics	
in	the	Royal	Navy,	1900-1914’,	Journal	of	Strategic	Studies	38	(2015),	pp.	985-1005.).	The	technical	aspects	of	
gunnery	control	are	dealt	with	by	John	Brooks,	Dreadnought	Gunnery	and	the	Battle	of	Jutland:	The	Question	
of	Fire	Control	(Abingdon,	2005),	caustically	reviewed	in	J.	T.	Sumida,	‘Gunnery,	Procurement,	and	Strategy	in	
the	Dreadnought	era’,	Journal	of	Military	History,	69	(2005),	pp.	1179-1187;	response	by	J.	Brooks,	Journal	of	
Military	History,	70	(2006),	pp.	195-200).		Lanchestrian	thinking	is	never	discussed	explicitly	in	this	literature,	
but	Sumida	notes	the	dynamic	nature	of	British	tactical	thinking,	and	the	Royal	Navy’s	`Intelligent	
consideration	of	…	fleet	fire	and	movement	–	that	is,	the	naval	historical	equivalent	of	“inherent	military	
probability”’.		The	Royal	Navy’s	organizational	culture	and	its	effect	on	command	and	control	are	explored	in	a	
landmark	work	by	Andrew	Gordon,	The	Rules	of	the	Game:	Jutland	and	British	Naval	Command	(Annapolis,	
1997).	However,	Gordon	does	not	discuss	fleet	tactics.	The	point	that	they	should	not	be	neglected	after	a	
period	of	rapid	technological	change	is	made	in	M.	Allen,	‘The	Deployment	of	Untried	Technology:	British	
Naval	Tactics	in	the	Ironclad	Era’,	War	in	History,	15	(2008),	pp.	269-293.	
4
	The	most	comprehensive	bibliography	and	most	thorough	discussion	of	the	fleet	tactics	of	this	or	any	other	
era	is	Wayne	P.	Hughes,	Fleet	Tactics	(Annapolis,	1986).		In	various	other	articles,	which	we	shall	refer	to	later,	
Hughes	explores	the	relations	among	technology,	tactics	and	the	operational	level	of	naval	warfare.		For	a	
4	
	
theme	is	of	the	quantification	and	mathematization	of	the	role	of	the	‘big	gun’.	In	the	early	
twentieth	century,	theorists	in	many	countries	were	exploring	means	of	predicting	victory	or	defeat	
in	battle	through	the	use	of	geometry	and	calculus.	The	most	famous	example	is	the	British	engineer	
and	scientist	F.W.	Lanchester’s	‘square	law’,	which	provided	a	revolutionary	understanding	of	the	
effects	of	modern	weaponry,	and	predicted	that	an	outgunned	force	was	likely	to	suffer	an	
accelerating	rate	of	loss	relative	to	its	opponent	until	it	was	completely	destroyed.
5
	Even	military	
analysts,	however,	are	often	unaware	that	the	essential	conclusions	of	the	Square	Law	were	
independently	arrived	at	in	the	USA	(twice),	Russia	and	France,	though	apparently	not	in	Germany.
6
	
This	body	of	work	warned	against	accepting	battle	if	even	slightly	outnumbered,	and	stressed	the	
desirability	of	an	initial	unopposed	period	of	fire,	however	brief,	and	of	dividing	an	enemy	force	and	
destroying	it	in	detail.		
				The	effect	of	such	thinking	on	the	contest	between	British	and	German	battlefleets	was	profound.	
Jellicoe	informed	Lanchester	that	‘your	N-square	law	has	become	famous	in	the	Grand	Fleet’,
7
	and	at	
the	strategic	level	the	high	German	concept	of	the	naval	war	against	Britain,	the	risk	fleet	
[Risikoflotte],	evolved	into	a	classic	Lanchestrian	plan	of	detaching	and	destroying	a	portion	of	the	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
summary	of	recent	work	by	historians	see	M.	S.	Seligmann,	‘The	renaissance	of	pre-First	World	War	naval	
history’,	Journal	of	Strategic	Studies,	36	(2013),	pp.	454-479.	
5
	F.	W.	Lanchester,	Aircraft	in	Warfare:	the	Dawn	of	the	Fourth	Arm		(London,	1916),	based	on	articles	in	
Engineering,	98	(1914),	pp.	422-423	and	pp.	452-453.		
6
	J.	V.	Chase,		‘A	Mathematical	Investigation	of	the	Effect	of	Superiority	of	Force	in	Combats	Upon	the	Sea’,	
unpublished	secret	paper,	1902	(reprinted	in	Appendix	C	of	Fiske,	Fighting	Machine,	below);	Bradley	A.	Fiske,	
‘American	Naval	Policy’,	USNI	Prize	Essay,	Proceedings	of	the	United	States	Naval	Institute	[PUSNI]	31	(1905),	
pp.	1-80;	Bradley	A.	Fiske,	The	Navy	as	a	Fighting	Machine	(New	York,	1916;	reissued	in	the	Classics	of	Sea	
Power	series,	Naval	Institute	Press,	Annapolis,	1988;	Lt	A.	Baudry	(French	Navy),	The	Naval	Battle:	studies	of	
tactical	factors	(London,	1914);	M.	Osipov,	‘The	influence	of	the	numerical	strength	of	engaged	forces	on	their	
casualties’	(1915),	translated	by	R.	Helmbold	and	A.	S.	Rahm,	Naval	Research	Logistics,	42	(1995),	pp.	435-490.	
7
	Letter	from	Jellicoe	to	Lanchester,	15th	June	1916,	held	as	B3/18,	Lanchester	archive,	University	of	Coventry.	
5	
	
larger	Grand	Fleet	and	then	engaging	the	remainder	on	equal	or	numerically	favourable	terms	
[Kraftausgleich].
8
	
				From	the	Lanchestrian	perspective,	apparent	certainties	relating	to	Jutland	become	problematical.	
The	German	concentration	on	armour	protection	at	the	expense	of	gun-power,	for	example,	was	not	
necessarily	more	rational	than	the	British	aim	of	producing	a	larger	number	of	hulls	with	greater	
numbers	of	higher	calibre	guns	while	cutting	expensive	corners	with	lighter	and	less	intricately	
arranged	armour.	Nor	does	this	contrast	in	preparation	inevitably	paint	a	picture	of	British	technical	
and	industrial	decline,	instead	suggesting	a	more	nuanced	quantitative	understanding	of	the	
mechanics	of	fleet	action	than	that	of	the	potential	enemy.	Similarly,	we	can	now	provide	a	clearer	
picture	than	before	of	the	intellectual	milieu	in	which	the	tactical	views	of	the	commanders	were	
formed,	and	of	the	role	of	chance	and	of	the	dilemmas	facing	them,	in	the	context	of	what	Wayne	
Hughes	has	called	the	‘strategy-tactics	dialectic’.
9
	Did	the	catastrophic	explosions	on	British	
battlecruisers	indicate	that	a	greater	disaster	had	been	avoided	fortuitously,	or	were	they	the	result	
of	a	particular	and	unlikely	combination	of	circumstances	favouring	the	Germans?	When	the	British	
commander,	Admiral	Jellicoe,	turned	away	from	the	German	fleet,	was	this	because	he	lacked	drive	
and	daring,	or	was	he	simply	unwilling	to	fight	the	melee	battle	his	enemy	needed	and	craved	as	
their	only	path	to	a	meaningful	victory?		
																																								 																				
8
	The	point	of	departure	for	German	tactics	was	that	‘victory	is	possible	only	if	the	enemy	makes	mistakes’	
(Vice	Adm	W.	Wegener,	The	Naval	Strategy	of	the	World	War		(Berlin,	1929;	trans.	H.	H.	Herwig,		Annapolis,	
1989)).	For	a	survey	of	German	pre-war	tactical	thinking	see	Frank	Nägler,	‘Operational	and	Strategic	Plans	in	
the	Kaiser’s	Navy	prior	to	World	War	I’,	in	Epkenhans,	Skagerrakschlacht/Jutland.	.For	contemporary	views	see	
Adm	R.	Scheer,	Germany’s	High	Sea	Fleet	in	the	World	War	(London,	1920);	Otto	Groos,	Der	Krieg	in	der	
Nordsee	(Berlin,	1922,	the	official	history);	Fritz	Otto	Busch,	Die	schlacht	am	Skagerrak	(Berlin,	1933);	Walter	
Gladisch,	Skagerrak:	Die	Schlacht	am	31.	Mai	1916	(Berlin,	1936);	Georg	von	Hase,	Der	Sieg	der	deutschen	
Hochseeflotte	am	31.	Mai	1916.	Die	Skagerrak-Schlacht	nach	den	amtlichen	deutschen	und	englischen	Quellen	
dargestellt	(Leipzig,1934).	
9
			Wayne	P.	Hughes,	‘Naval	tactics	and	their	influence	on	strategy’,	Naval	War	College	Review		39	(1986),	pp.	
2-17.	That	modern	navies	have	lessons	to	learn	from	such	history	is	emphasized	by	LtCdr	B.	Armstrong,	`Now	
Hear	This	–	“If	We	Are	to	Remain	a	World	Power"',	PUSNI,	139/5/1	(2013),	p.	323.	See	also	James	R.	Holmes	
and	Toshi	Yoshihara,	‘History	rhymes:	the	German	precedent	for	Chinese	seapower’,	Orbis	54	(2010)	14-34.	
6	
	
	
I	
It	is	a	truism	that	almost	all	of	the	technical	developments	in	land	warfare	before	the	First	World	
War,	for	example	barbed	wire,	railways	and	fixed	machine	guns,	favoured	defence.	In	naval	warfare,	
there	had	been	a	comparable	period	of	40	years	or	so	after	the	development	of	the	ironclad	during	
which	defence	was	superior	and	capital	ships’	ability	to	damage	each	other	with	gunnery	was	mostly	
limited.
10
	Further,	very	few	major	naval	engagements	took	place	during	this	period,	limiting	
empirical	evidence	from	which	to	learn.	The	ironclad	era	famously	opens	at	Hampton	Roads	in	the	
American	civil	war,	with	Monitor	and	Virginia	(the	converted	Merrimack)	bouncing	shots	off	each	
other.		Consequently,	the	ancient	tactic	of	ramming	was	rediscovered,	and	sank	ships	at	the	
Austrian-Italian	battle	of	Lissa.
11
	But	development	of	gunnery	continued	in	parallel	to	armour:	for	
example,	the	rifled	muzzle-loaders	of	the	1870s	could,	in	principle,	penetrate	the	compound	armour	
of	the	day.
12
	The	Russian-Japanese	battle	of	Tsushima	(1905)	was	fought	using	batteries	of	mixed	
calibre,	and	offered	limited	lessons.
13
	However,	some	crucial	elements	were	now	apparent.	The	
significance	of	the	advent	and	development	of	the	torpedo,	and	its	potential	deadliness	to	capital	
																																								 																				
10
	For	the	parallel	developments	in	guns,	armour	and	propulsion	from	the	early	ironclads	to	the	First	World	
War		see	K.	Lautenschlager,	‘Technology	and	the	evolution	of	naval	warfare’,	International	Security,	8	(1983),	
pp.	3-51.	
11
	For	this	stage	of	naval	tactics	see	for	example	G.	H.	U.	Noel,	The	Gun,	Ram,	and	Torpedo:	Manoeuvres	and	
Tactics	of	a	Naval	Battle	in	the	Present	Day	(London,	1874)	and	W.	Bainbridge-Hoff,	Examples,	conclusions,	and	
maxims	of	Modern	Naval	Tactics	(Washington,	DC,	1884).	Ramming	was	still	considered	an	option	in	Lt	A.	P.	
Niblack,	USN,	‘The	Tactics	of	Ships	in	the	Line	of	Battle’,	USNI	Prize	Essay,	PUSNI,	22	(1896),	pp.	1-28.	
Interestingly,	Adm	Doveton	Sturdee,	best	known	for	his	success	at	the	Falkland	Islands,	claimed	in	his	1893	
Naval	Prize	Essay		to	have	been	the	first	writer,	in	1886,	to	have	decisively	rejected	the	ram	(Cdr	D.	Sturdee,	
‘The	Tactics	Best	Adapted	for	Developing	the	Power	of	Existing	Ships	and	Weapons	(Gun,	Ram,	and	Torpedo)	
Which	Should	Regulate	Fleets,	Groups	and	Single	Vessels	in	Action',	1893,	Royal	United	Services	Institution	
Naval	Prize	Essay,	in	SDEE	1/8,	Churchill	Archive	Centre,	Cambridge).	
12
	Lautenschläger,	Technology.	
13
	Fiske,	for	example,	attributes	the	Japanese	victory	mainly	to	superior	training	and	gunnery.	Bradley	A.	Fiske,	
‘Why	Togo	Won’,	PUSNI	31	(Dec.	1905)		807-809.	
7	
	
ships,	were	confirmed	at	Tsushima.	Belt	and	turret	armour,	“cemented”	(carbonized,	and	thus	
hardened)	on	the	outside	while	remaining	flexible	on	the	inside,	was	penetrable	only	by	high-
velocity	armour-piercing	heavy	shells.		Finally,	the	steam	turbine	offered	a	revolutionary	and	
superior	new	form	of	propulsion.	
				The	launching	of	HMS	Dreadnought	in	1906	thus	represented	the	culmination	of	an	era	in	
strategic	and	tactical	thinking	just	as	it	introduced	a	new	one	in	warship	design.		Concentration	on	
clusters	of	powerful,	quick-firing	main	guns	in	battleships	settled	the	issue	between	proponents	of	
this	solution	and	advocates	of	mixed	medium	and	large-calibre	armament,	and	thus	between	short	
and	long	range	engagements,	though	this	acrimonious	debate	would	reach	a	peak	of	intensity	with	
the	arrival	of	the	new	vessels.	There	was	no	longer	any	prospect	of	capital	ships	demolishing	each	
other	with	numerous	secondary	guns
14
	or	of	closing	to	within	ramming	distance	of	modern	
opponents,	and	the	need	for	closely	controlled	tactical	evolutions	to	bring	about	such	a	situation	
was	also	gone.	But	there	was	now	a	range	of	fresh	problems.		What	was	the	newly	optimal	capital	
ship,	with	what	displacement	and	combination	of	armour,	propulsion	and	armament?	And	what	
were	the	correct	tactics	for	such	a	fleet	in	this	new	era	of	gunnery	accurate	at	increasingly	long	
ranges?	
				At	its	simplest,	the	Square	Law	states	that,	in	attritional	combat	with	long-range	aimed	weapons	
against	which	there	is	no	effective	defence,	the	outcome	depends	on	which	side	possesses	the	
greater	`fighting	strength’,	defined	to	be	the	weapons’	individual	effectiveness	multiplied	by	the	
square	of	their	numbers.
15
	The	20
th
	century	convention	was	that	this	process	must	be	described	
																																								 																				
14
	Fiske,	‘American	Naval	Policy’,	considers	carefully	the	scaling	relation	between	medium	(6”)	and	large	(12”)	
calibre	guns,	concluding	that	a	ship	armed	with	more	numerous	6”	guns	fires	eight	times	the	weight	of	shell,	
but	that	`if	the	guns	are	too	small	to	destroy	[the	enemy’s]	turrets	and	water-line,	this	energy	is	wholly	wasted’	
(Fiske’s	emphasis).	This	is	the	crucial	point	on	which	the	new	understanding	supersedes	that	of,	in	particular,	
the	1905	battle	of	Tsushima.	
15
	The	Square	Law,	normally	exclusively	attributed	to	Lanchester,	is	also	clearly	stated	in	Baudry,	The	Naval	
Battle.	
8	
	
using	calculus;	Lanchester	in	Britain,	Osipov	in	Russia	and	Chase	in	the	USA	did	this	independently.
16
	
Its	implications	for	naval	warfare	are	most	fully	explored	in	the	USNI	Prize	Essay	of	1905	by	Fiske.
17
		
In	keeping	with	20
th
	century	usage,	however,	we	will	call	this	body	of	thought	‘Lanchestrian’.	
				Fiske’s	essay	contained	no	calculus,	but	rather	modelled	big-gun	naval	combat	as	a	series	of	
discrete	salvos,	with	the	implications	being	drawn	from	a	set	of	tables	–	nowadays	we	might	well	call	
them	‘spreadsheets’	–	as	opposed	to	equations.	His	conclusions	were	stark:	the	side	with	the	greater	
number	of	big	guns	brought	to	bear	would	realise	a	disproportionate	and	accelerating	advantage,	
eventually	annihilating	its	opponent	with	a	final	remaining	force	much	greater	than	the	initial	
imbalance.
18
	Further,	the	side	which	could	begin	firing	first	would	enjoy	a	further	advantage,	again	
out	of	all	proportion	to	naïve	expectations,	as	worked	out	by	Baudry	in	an	example	in	which	he	gives	
one	fleet	a	mere	four	minutes’	initial	unopposed	fire.
19
		
				Complementing	this	calculus-based	insight	was	another,	based	on	geometry.	In	contrast	to	the	
Nelsonian	era,	the	big	gun	was	effective	at	long	range	relative	to	distances	travelled	by	ships	on	
																																								 																				
16
	Lanchester,	Aircraft	in	Warfare;	Osipov,	‘Influence’;	Chase,	‘Mathematical	Investigation’.	The	crux	of	the	
square	law	is	a	point	made	in	Baudry,	The	Naval	Battle.	If	two	ships	fight	one,	then	not	only	does	the	lone	ship	
receive	double	the	rate	of	fire,	but	its	own	fire	is	divided.	Thus	the	proportional	rates	of	attrition	are	in	the	
ratio	1:4,	not	1:2.	The	full	implication	of	this	instantaneous	truth	only	emerges	when	one	sums	its	effects	over	
the	full	battle.	
17
	Fiske,	‘American	Naval	Policy’.	
18
	“Big	guns”	here	means	those	of	11”	calibre	or	greater.	Fiske	notes	that	while	smaller	guns	may	be	able	to	
produce	(through	number	and	rate	of	fire)	a	greater	overall	weight	of	fire,	this	is	unproductive	if	they	are	
unable	to	penetrate	armour	or	destroy	turrets.	At	Jutland,	the	probability	that	a	big-gun	hit	would	destroy	a	
turret	was	similar	for	the	two	opposing	forces,	despite	differences	in	calibre.	
19
	Fiske,	‘American	Naval	Policy’.	The	point	about	initial	advantage	(Fiske,	‘Fighting	Machine’,	p291;	Baudry,	
The	Naval	Battle,	p116)	was	well	understood	by	Jellicoe:	for	example,	in	the	Grand	Fleet	Battle	Orders	in	force	
on	the	eve	of	Jutland,	he	states	‘I	attach	the	greatest	importance	to	making	full	use	of	the	fire	of	our	heavier	
guns	in	the	early	stages	at	long	range	…	[this]	may	give	us	the	initial	advantage	in	gunfire	which	it	is	so	
important	to	obtain’	(Jellicoe	Papers,	vol.I,	item	226).	See	also	Theodore	C.	Taylor,	‘Tactical	Concentration	and	
Surprise	─	in	Theory’,	Naval	War	College	Review	38	(1985),	pp.	41-51;	and	Hughes,	‘Naval	tactics	and	their	
influence	on	strategy’.	
9	
	
battle	timescales,	so	that	concentrating	weapons	no	longer	required	massing	of	ships.
20
	Instead	
‘applied	geometry’	was	needed,	the	fleet	commander’s	goal	being	to	arrive	at	a	geometrical	
configuration	in	which	all	of	his	big	guns	could	be	concentrated	on	his	enemy	while	denying	enemy	
attempts	to	do	the	reverse.		It	is	in	the	Royal	Navy	that	we	find	the	case	put	most	strongly,	with	
Reginald	Plunkett-Drax,	writing	after	Jutland	while	on	Beatty’s	staff,	asserting	that:	`It	is	“Applied	
Geometry"	that	must	ensure	for	us	the	crushing	effect	to	be	obtained	by	bringing	all	our	forces	into	
action	at	the	same	moment.	Geometry	...	Geometry	...	Geometry	...	The	leader	of	a	large	fleet	should	
diligently	cultivate	in	himself	a	“geometric	sense”’.
21
	We	can	see	how	this	dictation	of	calculus	by	
geometry	played	out	at	Jutland	in	Figure	1,	which	plots	(on	a	logarithmic	scale,	over	time)	the	ratio	
of	British	to	German	big	guns	in	action.	For	the	British,	Lanchestrian	advantage	is	achieved	when	this	
ratio	is	maximized	(and	vice	versa	for	the	Germans).	
				Thus	the	tactical	imperative	was	to	use	fleet	geometry	to	dictate	calculus,	giving	a	cogent	reason,	
beyond	the	fleet	commander’s	natural	desire	to	keep	his	force	under	control,	for	a	single	battle	line	
rather	than	divisional	tactics.
22
	The	conclusion	is	that	fleet	or	‘operational’	tactics,	as	opposed	to	
																																								 																				
20
	Indeed,	‘the	more	widely	separated	the	points	from	which	the	fire	originates,	the	more	effective	tactically	is	
the	concentration,	because	the	more	difficult	it	is	to	counter’	(Capt.	E.	W.	Harding,	RMA,	‘Studies	in	the	Theory	
of	Naval	Tactics	III’,	Naval	Review,	4	(1913),	pp.	208-222);	‘in	a	modern	fleet	owing	to	the	great	distance	at	
which	the	guns	can	develop	their	maximum	hitting	capacity	…	the	principle	of	C	O	N	C	E	N	T	R	A	T	I	O	N	can	be	
effected	by	the	convergence	of	fire	from	widely	dispersed	positions	(R.	Plunkett-Ernle-Erle-Drax,	‘Notes	on	
Grand	Fleet	Battle	Tactics’,	16/12/1916	(written	for	David	Beatty),	in	DRAX	1/18,	Churchill	Archive	centre,	
Cambridge).	
21
	Drax,	‘Notes	on	Grand	Fleet	Battle	Tactics’,	DRAX	1/18;	see	also	‘Grand	Fleet	Battle	tactics’,	1/1/17,	in	
BTY/7/2,	Caird	Library,	Greenwich).	In	the	light	of	this,	his	public	assertion	after	Jutland	that	`what	we	required	
was	…	less	geometry	and	more	ginger’	is	blatant	hypocrisy	(R.	Plunkett-…-Drax,	‘Jutland	or	Trafalgar?’,	Naval	
Review	13	(1925)	238-243).	Many	pre-war	authors	treat	naval	tactics	as	a	geometrical	problem,	for	example	
Baudry,	The	Naval	Battle,	and	R.	Bernotti,	The	Fundamentals	of	Naval	Tactics	(Annapolis,	1912).		Even	where	
plane	geometry	is	not	explicitly	the	paradigm,	its		language	pervades	tactical	writings	(for	example	Capt.	E.	J.	
W.	Slade,	‘Battleships	and	Battleship	Tactics’,	Royal	Naval	War	College	report	no.3,	11/1906,	in	HTN/116/B,	
Caird	Library,	Greenwich).	
22
	For	the	development	of	the	contrasting	tactics	see	McLaughlin,	Battlelines.	Drax	considers	divisional	tactics	
in	an	essay	for	Beatty	of	9
th
	August	1917,	held	in	BTY/7/2,	Caird	Library,	Greenwich.	His	governing	principle	is	
concentration:	he	notes	that	the	battle-line	principle	of	‘”fire	at	your	opposite	number”	[will]	neglect	priceless	
10	
	
smaller-scale	ship	or	division	tactics,	became	a	key	determinant	of	success.
23
	The	side	with	the	
numerical	advantage	in	weapons	was	guaranteed	a	successful	outcome	if	it	could	create	the	
conditions	described	above.		So	these	developments	implied	more	orderly	fleet	actions	than	had	
hitherto	been	envisaged.	Difficulties	in	surprising	an	opponent	increased	the	likelihood	that	well-
matched	fleets	would	meet	broadside	to	broadside	with	their	entire	strength	in	capital	ships	
deployed	in	line	of	battle.	In	such	a	situation,	with	good	visibility	and	sufficient	time	for	the	
engagement	to	be	concluded,	an	almost	textbook	employment	of	Lanchester’s	equations	could	be	
played	out	in	which	the	advantages	of	concentration	could	be	realised.		‘Symmetrical’	conditions	of	
this	type,	in	which	neither	side	enjoyed	an	advantage	beyond	superiority	in	materiel,	would	certainly	
end	in	the	destruction	of	the	weaker	force,	at	a	lesser	absolute	cost	to	the	larger.	The	thoughtful	and	
well-read	commander	of	the	superior	force	would	be	aware	of	the	subtle	variations	in	achievement	
of	these	conditions.	In	such	circumstances	a	fleet	which	knew	itself	to	be	outgunned	would	refuse	
battle,	and	its	opponent	would	enjoy	the	effective	fruits	of	victory	without	having	to	fight.	The	point	
is	perhaps	best	made	by	Wayne	Hughes,	who,	quoting	Clausewitz	on	‘engagements	that	did	not	take	
place	but	had	merely	been	offered',	notes	that	there	is	no	defence	in	naval	war,	and	that	the	inferior	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
opportunities	for	concentrated	fire	at	a	nearer	target’.	But	of	course	such	concentration	can	also	be	effected	
by	a	battle	line.	An	intermediate	possibility	is	to	fight	en	echelon,	as	advocated	in	Lt	A.	P.	Niblack,	‘The	tactics	
of	ships	in	the	line	of	battle’,	PUSNI,	22	(1896),	pp.	1-28:	‘the	advantage	will	always	be	[to]	echelon,	if	correctly	
manoeuvred	against	a	fleet	formed	in	line,	[for]	it	is	[then]	difficult	to	double	upon	any	of	them.	Yet	Bacon,	a	
staunch	Jellicoe	supporter,	was	able	to	write	that	`in	1900	at	the	War	Course	at	Greenwich	I	used	to	work	the	
tactical	board	…	against	all	comers,	and	never	could	any	opponents	obtain	a	tactical	advantage	by	assuming	
any	other	formation	than	line	ahead'.	Adm	Sir	Reginald	Bacon,	A	Naval	Scrap-Book,	1877-1906	(London,	1925).	
Jellicoe	simply	says	that	‘to	divide	the	fleet	is	to	court	disaster’.	Jellicoe	Papers,	vol.1,		item	206.	
23
	There	is	no	explicitly	operational	level	of	tactical	thought	in	pre-First	World	War	writing	on	naval	matters.	
One	has	the	calculus	of	Fiske,	Chase,	Baudry	and	Lanchester,	and	the	clearly	geometrical	reasoning	needed	to	
exploit	it,	but,	as	we	saw	above,	no	clear	consensus	about	fleet	tactics	had	emerged.	For	a	modern	
perspective,	see	Wayne	P.	Hughes,	‘Naval	Operations:	a	close	look	at	the	operational	level	of	war	at	sea’,	Naval	
War	College	Review,	65	(2012),	pp.	23-47.	
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force	always	loses	(and	does	so	disproportionately	badly):	‘[since]	Scheer	knew	his	fleet	was	
decisively	inferior,	there	was	never	a	fight	to	the	finish'.
24
	
				Lanchester’s	equations	enjoyed	great	popularity	among	military	analysts	in	the	20
th
	century,	when	
they	were	often	used	to	model	land	battles	and	campaigns,	albeit	with	only	partial	success.
25
	But	
land	warfare	was	known	to	be	greatly	subject	to	the	fog	of	war,	and	the	commander	of	inferior	
forces	could	often	hope	to	engineer	a	partial	victory	through	well-chosen	tactics	exploiting	variable	
factors	such	as	concealment	of	forces,	superior	communications	or	difficult	terrain.		The	Jutland-era	
naval	battle,	however,	apparently	carried	the	mathematical	inevitability	of	the	Square	Law.
26
	This	
was	well	captured	in	the	military	theorist	J.	F.	C.	Fuller’s	assessment	of	the	naval	defeat	at	Coronel:	
`Cradock’s	[ships]	went	to	the	bottom,	not	through	an	act	of	God,	but	through	an	act	of	
mathematical	certainty’.
27
	The	only	hope	for	an	outmatched	battle	fleet	was	to	engineer	a	situation	
in	which	it	could	engage	its	whole	force	against	a	detached	and	inferior	portion	of	the	enemy’s	
																																								 																				
24
	Hughes,	‘Naval	tactics	and	their	influence	on	strategy’.	For	the	German	perspective,	see	Wegener,	Naval	
Strategy	of	the	World	War.	On	the	stronger,	British	side	Sumida	notes	a	division	of	views	between	what	he	
calls	“agnostic	opportunists”	and	“clandestine	pre-empters”	(including	Jellicoe),	with	the	latter	taking	clearly	
the	position	that	battle	must	only	be	sought	under	the	correct,	favourable	conditions	(J.	T.	Sumida,	
‘Expectation,	Adaptation,	and	Resignation:	British	Battle	Fleet	Tactical	Planning,	August	1914	-	April	1916’,	
Naval	War	College	Review,	60	(2007),	pp.	101-122).		
25
	For	a	brief	introduction	see	N.	J.	MacKay,	‘Lanchester	combat	models’,	Mathematics	Today,	42	(2006),	pp.	
170-173.	For	an	introduction	to	mathematical	modelling	in	the	broad	sense	of	illuminating	core	dynamics	(as	
opposed	to	detailed,	calibrated	modelling	for	precise	prediction)	see	J.	M.	Epstein,	‘Why	model?’,	Journal	of	
Artificial	Societies	and	Simulation	11	(2008)	12.	
26
	At	least	in	fair	weather	and	in	the	absence	of	real	fog.	We	know	of	two	published	attempts	to	apply	
Fiske/Lanchester	models	to	Jutland.		Joseph	Czarnecki,	‘N-squared	law:	An	examination	of	one	of	the	
mathematical	theories	behind	the	Dreadnought	battleship’,	www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-076.htm,	
accessed	29	June	2012,	uses	Fiske	tables	for	five	cases	of	small	battles	between	Dreadnoughts,	and	concludes	
that	‘Britain	saw	the	opportunity	to	stack	the	deck	and	took	it.’	Colin	Lyle,	‘A	Nelsonian	Jutland?’,	Journal	of	the	
Royal	United	Services	Institute	[JRUSI],	140	(1995),	pp.	56-60,	invokes	Lanchester	(but	without	crunching	the	
numbers)	to	support	his	claim	that	a	more	Nelsonian	commander	would	‘eschew	the	too-unwieldy	single	line’	
and	thereby	have	exploited	the	square	law	to	achieve	a	crushing	victory	–	and	is	rebuked	by	Maj.	J.	D.	Harris,	
letter	to	JRUSI	140	(1995),	p68,	for	not	considering	Jellicoe’s	knowledge	of	his	technological	deficiencies.	
Indeed,	it	could	be	seen	as	one	of	the	implications	of	the	present	paper	that	it	was	the	Germans	who	needed	a	
Nelson	for	strategic	victory	at	Jutland,	not	the	British.	
27
	J.	F.	C.	Fuller,	The	Foundations	of	the	Science	of	War	(London,	1926),	ch.13,	section	8.	
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superior	fleet,	but	one	of	sufficient	size	to	guarantee	an	overall	numerical	superiority	after	this	first	
and	lesser	victory.	For	Germany	before	the	launching	of	Dreadnought,	this	seemed	a	forlorn	hope	
given	Britain’s	vast	numerical	superiority	in	capital	ships.	In	1899	the	German	Admiralty	staff	noted	
an	adverse	ratio	in	capital	ships	of	22:8	or	2.75:1.		In	early	1904	the	ratio	for	the	winter	of	1904-5	
was	expected	to	be	61:26	or	2.35:1.
28
	
				In	such	conditions	of	battlefleet	inferiority	the	risk	fleet	concept	could	only	function	in	certain	
circumstances.	For	many	years	it	was	assumed	that	the	British	would	attack	the	German	coast,	and	
attrition	of	the	Royal	Navy	by	coastal	defences	was	hoped	for.	This	scenario	envisaged	coastal	
artillery,	mines	and	torpedoes	inflicting	deep	losses	on	the	Royal	Navy	while	the	German	battlefleet	
was	held	in	reserve	for	a	coup	de	grâce	once	Kraftausgleich	had	been	achieved.	The	ultimate	British	
decision	for	a	distant	blockade	resting	on	the	fleet	based	at	Scapa	Flow	in	the	Orkneys	nullified	such	
thinking.		Jellicoe	was	also	acutely	conscious	of	the	danger	of	his	ships	suffering	underwater	damage	
close	to	the	German	coast	or	for	that	matter	in	a	fleet	action,
29
	though	perhaps	not	quite	to	such	an	
extent	that	his	‘sleepness	nights	were	visited	by	a	fearful	array	of	underwater	weapons’.
30
		The	
Germans	would	thus	be	forced	to	deploy	their	fleet	well	into	the	North	Sea	to	alter	the	strategic	
situation	relative	to	the	Royal	Navy.	
				It	was	also	assumed	that	the	sacrifice	of	the	German	fleet	would	weaken	the	British	unacceptably	
in	the	context	of	a	subsequent	struggle	with	a	third	power,	a	prospect	which	might	deter	British	
naval	attack	and	make	London	politically	more	amenable	in	peacetime.	The	possibility	of	Britain	
being	deterred	by	potential	losses	against	Germany	in	the	face	of	other	hostile	powers	also	faded,	
however,	as	the	British	engaged	in	a	blizzard	of	effective	diplomatic	activity	to	woo	traditional	rivals,	
aided	unconsciously	by	the	Kaiserreich	itself.	The	aggressive	German	posture	that	produced	the	
																																								 																				
28
	Nägler,	‘Operational	and	Strategic	Plans’,	p.	34.	
29
	See,	for	example,	Jellicoe’s	memorandum	of	12/4/16	to	the	First	Sea	Lord.	Jellicoe	Papers,	vol.1,		item	213.	
30
	Gordon,	The	Rules	of	the	Game,	pp.	466-7.	
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naval	challenge	to	Britain	was	replicated	in	other	areas	and	drew	her	potential	enemies	closer	
together.	The	Triple	Entente	neutralised,	at	least	for	the	present,	potential	naval	rivalry	between	
Britain,	Russia	and	France,	and	this	factor	coupled	with	the	Anglo-Japanese	alliance	and	British	
appeasement	of	US	interests	in	the	western	hemisphere	enabled	a	rapid	and	near	total	
concentration	of	British	capital	ships	in	the	North	Sea.		This	disastrous	outcome	for	Germany	
worsened	the	Lanchestrian	arithmetic	for	the	High	Seas	Fleet	and	removed,	for	the	foreseeable	
future,	another	pillar	of	the	risk	fleet’s	intellectual	foundations.	
	
	
II	
The	logic	of	Lanchestrian	modelling	had	profound	implications	for	national	policy	before	World	War	
One.	It	swiftly	became	apparent	that	Dreadnought	presented	a	level	playing	field	by	rendering	
Britain’s	previous	overwhelming	numerical	advantage	in	capital	ships	null	and	void,	but	it	is	less	well	
remembered	that	decisions	on	future	building	programmes	suddenly	carried	an	increased	and	
enormous	weight	of	responsibility.	Germany’s	risk	fleet	idea	was	instantly	more	credible,	though	the	
point	was	more	quickly	grasped	in	Britain	than	in	Germany.	The	building	of	dreadnoughts	‘was	
imitated	by	the	Germans’	as	critics	of	the	type	in	Britain	feared,	although	in	German	eyes	it	‘still	did	
not	overcome	the	superiority	of	the	Royal	Navy,	only	narrowing	it	somewhat’.
31
		
				In	square-law	terms	a	narrow	numerical	inferiority	was	no	more	cause	for	optimism	than	a	large	
one	in	a	clash	of	full	fleets	and	the	Kaiser’s	navy	was	unlikely	to	match	massive	British	building	
capacity	in	the	short	term,	especially	given	the	call	on	resources	commanded	by	the	army.	
																																								 																				
31
	Nägler,	‘Operational	and	Strategic	Plans’,	p.	44.	
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				Nevertheless,	the	possibility	of	dividing	and	defeating	the	Royal	Navy	in	the	Lanchestrian	manner	
by	constructing	a	sufficiently	large	force	of	dreadnoughts	and	setting	traps	for	a	detached	part	of	the	
Grand	Fleet	remained,	and	the	British	had	an	absolute	need	to	create	and	maintain	a	margin	of	
superiority	sufficient	to	preclude	any	prospect	of	a	clash	of	full	battle	fleets	and	which	could	survive	
attrition	through	mines,	submarine	attack	or	accident.	The	Germans	began	to	perceive	the	
possibility	of	a	distant	British	blockade	in	the	North	Sea	through	their	analysis	of	Royal	Navy	
manoeuvres,	particularly	those	of	1912,	and	realised	that	such	a	deployment	would	leave	the	British	
East	Coast	uncovered.	It	would	also	be	very	difficult	for	British	light	forces	to	track	German	sorties;	
destroyers	were	too	few	in	number	to	screen	the	North	Sea	at	distance	from	the	German	coast	and	
submarines	lacked	the	communication	range	to	report	movement.	Aggressive	action	toward	the	
British	coast	might	well	result	in	a	fleet	action	on	Germany’s	terms	as	the	Grand	Fleet	moved	south	
to	meet	such	a	German	attack.	This	line	of	thinking	‘painted	a	future	for	the	German	naval	war	that	
was	in	no	respects	bleak’.
32
		
The	Germans	retreated	from	such	aggressive	possibilities	after	their	manoeuvres	of	1913-14,	
however.	Among	reasons	for	this	were	‘fear	of	the	unknown’
33
	and	the	fact	that	‘German	experience	
of	fleet	operations	at	any	distance	from	the	German	coast	was	limited’.
34
	Ultimately,	the	High	Seas	
Fleet	‘existed	very	much	within	a	coastal	defence	mindset’:
35
	the	pattern	of	German	action	pursued	
at	Jutland	and	on	other	occasions	before	and	after	had	been	set.	Nevertheless,	possibilities	had	been	
revealed	that	more	forward	leadership	could	exploit.	
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	Nägler,	‘Operational	and	Strategic	Plans’,	p.50.	
33
	James	Goldrick,	Before	Jutland:	The	Naval	War	in	Northern	European	Waters,	August	1914-February	1915	
(Annapolis,	2015)	p.	73.	
34
	Goldrick,	Before	Jutland,	p.	71.	
35
	Goldrick,	Before	Jutland.	
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				It	was	also	true	that	the	Square	Law	was	scalable,	so	there	was	a	theoretical	possibility	of	an	
outnumbered	fleet	breaking	up	the	enemy	line	and	creating	a	local	superiority	within	the	battle	at	
the	level	of	squadrons	and	divisions.	This	had	a	Nelsonian	ring,	and	divisional	tactics	were	thus	
dangerously	appealing	to	some	in	the	numerically	dominant	Royal	Navy.	In	the	Dreadnought	age,	
however,	such	a	situation	would	represent	Germany’s	best	hope	of	success	in	fleet	action.
36
	
Jellicoe’s	insistence	on	deploying	the	Grand	Fleet	in	battle	as	a	single	force	under	his	personal	
command	so	that	‘In	all	cases	the	ruling	principle	is	that	the	fleet	as	a	whole	keeps	together’
37
	
seemed	to	preclude	the	danger	of	his	fleet	being	subdivided	into	potentially	outnumbered	
components,	but	after	1906	the	British	investment	in	the	new	idea	of	the	battlecruiser	would	change	
this	situation	and	make	a	dangerous	divisional	clash	more	likely.	
	
				The	first	battlecruiser,	HMS	Invincible,	resembled	Dreadnought	but	was	much	faster,	speed	being	
gained	at	the	expense	of	armoured	protection	and	thus	with	no	compromise	in	gunpower.	Such	a	
vessel	could	overwhelm	any	smaller	opponent	and	easily	escape	an	ordinary	dreadnought.	The	
battlecruiser	concept	was	appealing	to	a	Navy	with	global	policing	responsibilities,	but	the	ships	
would	also	be	expected	to	perform	reconnaissance	for	the	fleet.	In	the	light	of	this,	and	in	grave	
tension	with	their	design	purpose	as	hunters	of	ocean	raiders,	they	became	expected	to	join	the	line	
of	battle	after	their	reconnaissance	mission	was	completed	in	a	fleet	action.	Regardless	of	the	
capabilities	of	the	ships	this	created	danger	for	the	Royal	Navy	in	a	number	of	ways.	First,	the	idea	
received	heavy	investment:	by	1916,	ten	battle	cruisers	were	in	service.	They	were	based	separately	
																																								 																				
36
	The	belief	that	the	British	would	have	benefited	from	a	more	manoeuvre-based,	Nelsonian	approach	echoed	
through	the	inter-war	years.	Cdr	Russell	Grenfell,	The	Art	of	the	Admiral	(London,	1937),	based	on	his	lectures	
at	the	Royal	Naval	Staff	College,	Greenwich;	Captain	Richard,	French	Navy,	‘Jutland	and	the	Principles	of	War’,	
trans.	from	Revue	Maritime	in	JRUSI,	67	no.465	(1922),	pp.	128-139.	No	one	seems	to	have	understood	the	
randomizing	effect	of	the	melee	on	the	Lanchestrian	certainty	of	the	battle	line,	which	we	quantify	later.	
37
	Gordon,	The	Rules	of	the	Game,	p.	397.	
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from	the	battleships	of	the	Grand	Fleet	and	officially	and	misleadingly	described	as	the	Battle	Cruiser	
Fleet	[BCF].	As	the	Germans	were	aware,	this	meant	that	nearly	a	third	of	the	Royal	Navy’s	capital	
ship	gun	power	was	seated	in	vessels	which	must	sail	separately	from	their	base	at	Rosyth	to	
rendezvous	with	the	Grand	Fleet	before	a	continuous	line	of	battle	could	be	formed,	and	which	
would	actually	seek	out	the	German	fleet	separately	before	such	a	union	could	be	established.	The	
Commander	of	the	BCF,	Rear	Admiral	Sir	David	Beatty,	was	also	known	to	be	an	aggressive	figure,	
keen	to	assert	independent	leadership	and	who	‘wanted	to	grasp	the	big	picture	and	see	his	role	in	
the	larger	context’.
38
		From	the	German	perspective	he	was,	in	the	context	of	their	plans,	the	ideal	
opponent.	
				The	decision	to	compromise	in	armour	rather	than	firepower	or	speed	also	had	obvious	dangers,	
though	there	were	countervailing	advantages.	As	part	of	the	line,	British	battle	cruisers	could	
contribute	effectively	to	a	fleet	engagement	with	their	heavy	armament	while	the	risk	created	by	
their	lighter	armour	would	be	mitigated	by	the	German	need	to	divide	their	fire	against	the	more	
numerous	British	fleet.	In	their	reconnaissance	role,	however,	numerical	superiority	for	the	BCF	was	
not	guaranteed,	and	here	the	thin	armour	of	the	vessels	was	especially	dangerous.	Beatty’s	role	was	
to	force	his	way	through	an	enemy	screen	of	similar	vessels	and	find	the	enemy	battle	fleet.	The	
perceived	need	to	get	in	close	would	nullify	the	advantage	of	his	heavier	guns	relative	to	more	lightly	
armed	but	more	heavily	armoured	German	battle	cruisers	and	expose	his	lighter	armour.	There	was	
also	an	increased	prospect	of	melee	situations	developing	in	which	the	British	battlecruisers	might	
suddenly	face	a	grave	Lanchestrian	disadavantage.	
				But	this	does	not	necessarily	imply	that	British	technology	or	attitude	to	technology	was	at	fault.	
Indeed,	Invincible	represented	advanced	thinking	that	the	Germans	attempted	to	copy	before	the	
true	nature	of	the	British	vessel	was	revealed.	German	knowledge	of	her	configuration	was	
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	Andrew	Lambert,	Admirals:	The	Naval	Commanders	who	Made	Britain	Great	(London,	2008),	p.363.	
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necessarily	limited.	Tirpitz	therefore	pursued	a	design	in	line	with	his	own	priorities	for	a	vessel	of	
limited	cost	that	could	not	be	equated	with	a	battleship	so	as	not	to	threaten	his	campaign	to	gain	
funds	for	the	new	dreadnoughts	in	the	Reichstag
39
.	Thus	the	later	Blücher	was	conceptually	primitive	
and	no	match	for	the	British	vessel.	The	first	true	German	battlecruiser,	Von	der	Tann,	was	superior	
to	Invincible	in	all	respects	except	armament,	but	it	offered	no	design	innovation	and	reflected	
thinking	the	British	had	undertaken	when	the	Dreadnought	concept	was	new.	When	Von	der	Tann	
was	launched	in	March	1910,	nearly	three	years	after	Invincible,	three	British	battlecruisers	were	
already	in	service	and	the	much	larger	and	more	heavily	armed	Lion	would	be	laid	down	in	
November	of	that	year	and	launched	ten	months	later.	
				The	British	dilemma	was	in	effect	the	basic	economic	problem	of	possessing	limited	resources	to	
satisfy	unlimited	wants,	which	was	constantly	in	tension	with	Fisher’s	desire	that	Britain	lead	the	
naval	arms	race	on	all	measures.	Dreadnought	battleships	were	the	single	most	expensive	and	
technologically	advanced	items	that	a	state	could	purchase,	and	once	decisions	had	been	made	
mistakes	could	not	be	redeemed.	Having	decided	on	all-big-gun	ships,	a	decision	had	then	to	be	
made	about	the	trade-off	between	number	and	quality,	a	question	to	which	Lanchestrian	thinking	
had	a	clear	answer,	with	fighting	strength	given	by	quality	of	units	multiplied	by	the	square	of	their	
numbers.	The	Admiralty	was	well	aware	of	the	grave	issues	it	had	to	consider	and	in	1906,	while	the	
implications	of	the	new	Dreadnought	design	were	being	explored,
40
	a	committee	was	formed	under	
the	chairmanship	of	Captain	C.	L.	Ottley,	the	Director	of	Naval	Intelligence,	comprising	technical	
experts	including	Jellicoe.
41
	It	was	invited	to	consider,	among	other	matters,	the	introduction	of	a	
																																								 																				
39
		The	contention	that	a	British	disinformation	campaign	disguising	Invincible’s	radical	design	was	believed,	
has	been	disputed.	Norman	Friedman,	Fighting	the	Great	War	at	Sea:	Strategy	Tactics	and	Technology	
(Barnsley,	2014)	pp.	198-199.		
40
	Such	analysis	was	already	under	way	even	before	Dreadnought’s	sea	trials	had	begun	(‘HM	Ships	
Dreadnought	and	Invincible’,	24
th
	May	1906,	AL	252/4/8,	ALHRB).	
41
	This	is	usually	known	as	the	‘Fusion	Committee’,	although	the	battlecruiser/battleship	fusion	was	one	of	
three	matters	the	committee	was	formed	to	consider.	It	comprised	C.	R.	Ottley	(Director	of	Naval	Intelligence,	
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‘fusion’	class	of	capital	ship	combining	the	power	and	protection	of	the	dreadnought	battleship	and	
the	speed	of	the	battlecruiser	(still	referred	to	as	an	‘armoured	cruiser’	by	the	committee).	This	
would	in	effect	be	a	fast	battleship	with	heavy	armour,	powerful	armament	and	great	speed.	Such	a	
vessel	would	dominate	future	engagements	between	dreadnoughts,	but	its	precise	configuration,	
beyond	superiority	over	all	existing	designs,	was	still	a	matter	of	conjecture.	The	one	certainty	was	
that	it	would	be	very	expensive	relative	to	existing	dreadnoughts.	The	committee	believed	that	if	
Britain’s	new	vessels	were	to	be	‘of	the	“Fusion”	class,	for	the	same	expenditure	we	can	build	only	
three	as	against	four	“Dreadnoughts”	…	and	therefore	in	1909	we	shall	have	only	a	bare	numerical	
superiority	over	Germany	in	new	Armoured	Vessels.’
42
	
				This	was	unacceptable,	especially	as	Germany’s	response	‘should	be	and	probably	would	be’	to	
build	similar	vessels	emphasizing	greater	gun	power	at	the	expense	of	‘speed	or	coal	endurance’.	
The	British	fleet	would	thus	face	a	situation	in	which	‘our	ships	are	decidedly	inferior	to	theirs	in	
gunfire’.	In	terms	of	the	Square	Law	this	meant	doom,	and	the	committee	was	clear	that	‘speed,	
though	desirable,	cannot	be	assessed	at	so	high	a	value	as	a	superior	number	of	guns’.	The	
committee	agreed	that	the	fusion	concept	had	merit,	as	a	division	of	such	vessels	‘would	be	of	great	
value,		owing	to	their	great	speed	allowing	them	to	be	used	as	a	fast	“Flanking	Division”’	for	the	
battle	fleet’.	It	was	argued,	however,	that	‘this	function	is	non-existent	until	we	have	a	sufficient	
superiority	in	modern	Armoured	Vessels	over	other	countries’.	Interestingly,	this	superiority	was	
interpreted,	in	close	conformity	with	Lanchester,	strictly	in	terms	of	big-gun	firepower	rather	than	
number	of	ships.	The	committee	concluded	‘that	it	should	be	our	first	aim	to	add	gun-fire	to	our	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
in	the	chair),	J.	R.	Jellicoe	(Director	of	Naval	Ordnance),	R.	H.	S.	Bacon,	C.	Madden,	S.	Nicholson,	H.	Jones,	H.	
Orpen,	T.	E.	Crease	and	Graham	Greene.	In	Naval	Necessities	IV,	held	by	ALHRB,	Portsmouth.	
42
	The	Fusion	Committee’s	report	is	held	as	‘II-	Fusion	Design	of	Armoured	Design’	(sic),	in	report	of	Navy	
Estimates	Committee,	1906-7,	AL	253/28,	Admiralty	Library	Naval	Historical	Branch,	Portsmouth	[ALHRB].	
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Fleet	before	moving	in	the	direction	of	greatly	increased	speed,	and	that	the	proposed	“Fusion”	
ships	are,	for	the	moment,	premature’.
43
	
				A	momentous	decision	was	thus	taken	not	to	construct	such	vessels	until	a	sufficient	quantity	of	
less	capable	capital	ships	had	been	created	to	make	the	fusion	vessels’	appearance	decisive.	This	
resolution	was	accepted	by	the	Admiralty,	though	it	ran	counter	to	the	expectations	of	Fisher	when	
as	First	Sea	Lord	when	he	established	the	Fusion	Committee.
44
	Indeed,	the	decision	was	a	clear	
check	to	Fisher’s	programme	of	constant,	‘plunging’	innovation,	and	constituted	an	exemplary	case	
of	professional	policy	formulation	and	decision-making	by	a	learning	organisation.
45
	The	decision	to	
postpone	the	‘fusion’	ships	was	prescient	in	both	technical	and	strategic	terms.	In	1906,	the	pace	of	
development	was	such	that	the	Committee’s	idea	of	a	fusion	ship,	involving	wing	turrets	and	the	
new	13.5”gun,	would	resemble	the	first	super-dreadnoughts	of	the	Orion	class,	and	though	capable	
these	vessels	would	have	been	dated	by	1914.	Waiting	for	them	would	have	served	little	technical	
purpose	and	resulted	in	a	more	expensive	and	thus	smaller	fleet	when	war	broke	out.	It	could	even	
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	Fusion	Committee	report.	
44
	At	the	meeting	of	the	Sea	Lords	which	instigated	the	Fusion	Committee,	it	was	stated	that	‘It	was	desired	to	
bring	about	a	fusion	of	the	two	designs’	(i.e.	battleships	and	battlecruisers)	‘by	next	year;	it	seemed	possible	
for	this	to	be	done,	and	it	would	be	a	great	assistance	if	the	committee	would	look	into	this	matter.’	In	Naval	
Necessities	IV.	
45
	In	this	we	disagree	with	Angus	K.	Ross,	Four	lessons	that	the	US	Navy	must	learn	from	the	'Dreadnought'	
revolution,	Naval	College	War	Review	63	no.4	(2010),	pp.	119-143,	which	argues	that	Fisher	wanted	an	
innovative	revolution	and	the	Fusion	Committee	thwarted	this.	Ross	considers	this	outcome	to	be	failure,	and	
the	lesson	(for	the	21
st
	century	US	Navy)	the	importance	of	being	a	'learning	organization'.	We	instead	claim	
that	the	Fusion	Committee's	position	was	a	conscious,	technocratic	decision	which	guaranteed	British	naval	
supremacy	through	big-gun	firepower.	The	Royal	Navy’s	qualities	as	a	learning	organization	are	demonstrated	
throughout	the	archive	material	of	the	period.	For	example,	in	‘The	Building	Programme	of	the	British	Navy:	
The	lessons	of	the	Russo-Japanese	war	in	their	application	to	the	programme	of	armoured-ship	building	of	
Britain,	Germany,	and	France’	(AL	252/3/8,	15
th
	February	1906,	ALHRB)	we	find	a	balanced	and	thorough	
analysis	of	French,	Italian	and	US	commentary	on	Tsushima	(the	writer	is	clearly	an	attentive	reader	of	PUSNI).	
Similarly	‘Admiralty	Policy:	Replies	to	criticism’	(AL	252/5/8,	15
th
	October	1906,	ALHRB)	is	a	thorough	and	
balanced	140-page	response	to	criticism	of	the	Dreadnought	concept.		
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have	created	for	the	Germans	a	window	of	opportunity	during	the	first	few	months	of	the	war	
during	which	they	might	have	achieved	parity	or	even	a	small	advantage	in	big-gun	fire.
46
		
				The	design	of	the	actual	fusion	ships,	the	Queen	Elizabeth	Class,	was	not	finalised	until	1912.	Their	
new	configuration,	with	eight	new	15’’	guns	of	unprecedented	power	in	four	turrets,	rather	than	ten	
13.5’’	weapons	in	five,	provided	greater	firepower	and	a	saving	in	weight	which	was	translated	into	
both	heavier	armour	and	nearly	twice	the	propulsive	power	of	the	previous	class	of	super-
dreadnoughts.	They	also	promised	to	make	redundant	the	concept	of	constructing	separate	
battleships	and	battlecruisers,	as	the	new	vessels	were	expected	to	perform	both	roles	capably.	Even	
at	this	stage,	however,	technical	capability	fell	slightly	short	of	the	true	fast	battleship,	and	the	
battlecruiser	survived.		The	top	speed	of	the	Queen	Elizabeth	class	fell	between	the	maxima	of	
typical	battleships	and	battlecruisers,	and	the	apparent	success	of	battlecruisers	in	the	early	clashes	
at	the	Falkland	Islands	and	Heligoland	Bight	coupled	with	the	return	of	Fisher	as	First	Sea	Lord	
shortly	after	the	outbreak	of	war	led	to	the	commissioning	of	two	new	vessels	of	the	type,	Renown	
and	Repulse.	Indeed	Repulse	replaced	a	battleship	of	the	same	name	of	the	Royal	Sovereign	class	
already	in	the	early	stages	of	construction,	the	contract	for	which	was	cancelled.
47
	The	Royal	
Sovereign	class	vessels	themselves,	though	succeeding	the	Queen	Elizabeths,	also	reverted	to	the	
lower	speed	of	existing	battleships.		
				Despite	wartime	reversion	to	the	battlecruiser	concept,	the	new	Queen	Elizabeths	as	fusion	ships	
were	a	genuine	advance	on	the	original	Dreadnought	design	and,	like	Dreadnought,	outclassed	all	
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	A	fascinating	episode	in	the	development	of	these	ideas	is	the	Sims	vs	Mahan	controversy	in	the	USA,	which	
pitched	the	US	Inspector	of	Target	Practice	against	the	great	naval	historian	Mahan	in	the	pages	of	PUSNI.	Sims	
made	telling	arguments	in	favour	of	all-big-gun	ships,	but	the	interest	for	our	purposes	is	in	the	US-UK	
interchange	of	ideas.	Sims’	paper	for	Roosevelt,	‘Big	Battleships	of	High	Speed’,	was	sent	in	confidence	to	
Fisher	on	3
rd
	November	2007	(before	Roosevelt’s	January	1907	speech	to	congress	on	the	topic),	and	forms	the	
basis	of	the	argument	of	the	Director	of	Naval	Intelligence	C.	L.	Ottley’s	‘The	Strategic	Aspects	of	Our	Building	
Programme,	1907’	(AL	253/68,	ALHRB),	sent	to	the	King’s	private	secretary.	Sims	restated	his	argument	in	‘The	
Tactical	Qualities	of	the	Dreadnought	Type	of	Battleship’,	Brassey’s	Naval	Annual	1907,	pp.	391-409.		
47
	I.	Johnston,	Clydebank	Battlecruisers	(Barnsley,	2011),	p.92.	
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previous	vessels	afloat	when	they	entered	service.	The	ten	15”	ships	of	this	and	the	similarly-
configured	but	slower	and	more	heavily	armoured	Royal	Sovereign	class	did	not	join	the	fleet	until	
after	the	outbreak	of	war.	Their	arrival,	however,	added	massively	to	the	gun	power	of	the	existing	
Grand	Fleet,	transformed	what	for	Jellicoe	was	a	worryingly	narrow	margin	of	superiority	into	a	
decisive	advantage,	and	removed	any	prospect	of	a	German	challenge	to	the	full	Grand	Fleet.	Only	
two	comparable	vessels	of	the	German	Bayern	class	were	completed.	
				In	adopting	a	quantitative	approach	to	their	situation,	the	British	had	implicitly	taken	a	view	on	a	
mathematical	issue,	of	what	is	the	unit	of	offensive	and	defensive	force	concentration.	A	simplistic	
view	would	assert	that	this	was	the	capital	ship,	but	in	Lanchestrian	war	destruction	is	wrought	in	
proportion	to	the	number	of	effective	weapons,	big	guns	in	the	context	of	1916.
48
		The	British	had	
thus	determined	to	place	guns	on	the	water	as	quickly	as	possible.	By	the	time	the	last	ship	of	the	
four	Nassau	class	vessels	was	commissioned	in	May	1910,	the	Royal	Navy	had	commissioned	seven	
dreadnought	battleships	and	three	battlecruisers.	The	value	of	this	approach	became	still	more	
apparent	when	the	characteristics	of	the	Nassau	class	became	known.	Despite	their	heavy	armour	
and	high	build	quality	the	German	vessels	were,	as	with	Blücher,	backward	in	important	respects.	
The	Nassaus	had	obsolete	reciprocating	engines	rather	than	the	turbines	of	all	British	dreadnoughts.	
The	vessels	carried	an	imposing	twelve	guns	compared	to	the	standard	British	ten,		but	had	four	
wing	turrets,	two	on	each	side	of	the	vessel,	which	could	not	fire	across	deck.	Thus	only	eight	guns	
could	be	fired	in	broadside	and	a	third	of	the	ships’	firepower	was	wasted.	The	guns	were	of	11”	
calibre,	when	the	British	were	already	moving	to	13.5”	all	along	the	centreline.	
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	The	belief	that	the	ship	is	the	unit	can	lead	to	views	such	as	‘sea	battles	based	on	[big	guns]	were	bound	to	
be	indecisive	because	heavy	guns	hardly	ever	sank	ships’	(R.	Garcia	y	Robertson,	‘Failure	of	the	heavy	gun	at	
sea,	1898-1922’,	Technology	and	Culture,	28	(1987),	pp.	539-557).	In	contrast	we	argue	not	only	that	such	
battles	can	be	won,	by	destroying	turrets,	but	that	Lanchestrian	certainty	of	outcome	can	lead	to	strategic	
victory	after	inconclusive	fighting.	
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				A	ship	with	its	main	armament	unable	to	bear	in	broadside,	or	completely	wrecked	in	battle,	
contributes	nothing	in	the	Lanchester	equations	except	to	the	extent	to	which	it	deflects	fire	away	
from	still-active	ships.	The	unit,	rather,	is	the	set	of	weapons	which	stands	and	falls	together.	Fiske	
reached	the	unambiguous,	definitive	conclusion	that	the	appropriate	unit	was	the	big-gun	turret,	
and	this	view	remains	persuasive.
49
	German	turrets	enjoyed	no	special	advantage	over	British	in	
terms	of	protection	and	were	no	less	likely	to	be	disabled	or	destroyed	in	action.
50
	They	also	
contained	guns	of	lesser	calibre	than	their	British	opponents,	though	this	deficiency	would	tell	only	
at	long	ranges,	given	the	greater	accuracy	of	the	smaller	German	guns	and	the	limited	effectiveness	
of	British	shells	before	1916.	From	this	perspective,	that	of	a	battle	of	gun	turrets,	the	British	
advantage	in	gun	power	fully	justified	pre-war	policy	if	their	weapons	were	employed	to	full	effect.	
However,	if	the	explosions	on	the	British	battlecruisers	represented	a	generic	fault	in	Royal	Navy	
dreadnought	design,	so	that	the	destruction	of	a	turret	entailed	the	destruction	of	the	ship,	then	the	
whole	ship	would	have	to	be	considered	the	relevant	unit	of	mass,	with	radical	effects	on	the	
Lanchestrian	balance	in	Germany’s	favour.
51
		
				A	complicating	factor	in	addressing	this	issue	is	again	the	separate	command	of	the	Grand	Fleet	
under	Jellicoe	and	the	BCF	under	Beatty.	The	latter’s	aggressive	style	of	command	has	been	
identified	by	some	as	having	an	effect	on	the	vulnerability	of	his	vessels,	both	in	the	manner	of	their	
deployment	and	in	their	gunnery	training	and	the	procedures	they	employed	in	action.	Jellicoe,	by	
contrast,	has	been	characterised	by	his	critics	as	a	cautious	technocrat,	lacking	the	fighting	spirit	
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	‘each	[big-gun]	turret	with	its	guns	should	be	regarded	as	a	unit.	There	seems	to	be	no	escape	whatever	
from	the	conclusion	that	we	should	recognize	the	combination	as	our	unit	of	offensive	and	defensive	power...'	
(Fiske’s	italics),	Fiske,	‘American	Naval	Policy’,	p.	28.		
50
	J.	Campbell,	Jutland:	an	analysis	of	the	fighting		(London,	1986).	
51
	For	a	recent	treatment	see	N.	A.	Lambert,	‘‘Our	Bloody	Ships'	or	‘Our	Bloody	System'?	Jutland	and	the	loss	of	
the	battle	cruisers,	1916’,	Journal	of	Military	History,		62	(1998),	pp.	29-55.	
23	
	
necessary	in	a	fleet	commander.	The	Admiralty’s	assiduous	pre-war	planning	to	provide	a	fleet	
suitable	for	war	was	thus	at	the	mercy	of	those	employed	to	use	it.
52
	
	
III	
Having	built	a	fleet	calculated	to	guarantee	strategic	victory	under	Lanchestrian	conditions,	it	then	
became	essential	to	a	successful	outcome	that	this	fleet	be	commanded	so	as	to	bring	such	
conditions	about.	The	contrast	between	Jellicoe,	commander	in	1916	of	the	Grand	Fleet,	and	Beatty,	
commander	of	the	BCF,	was	in	many	ways	representative	of	their	intellectual	environment.	The	
impact	of	new	technology	and	new	thinking	created	a	fast	moving	debate	in	which	a	considerable	
degree	of	erudition	was	required	to	keep	up.
53
	Jellicoe	was	just	such	a	technocrat,	and	made	it	his	
business	to	keep	abreast	of	developments	and	explore	their	implications.	Beatty	represented	the	
opposite	end	of	the	spectrum.	Self-consciously	Nelsonian,	he	interpreted	this	tradition	in	terms	of	
aggressive,	thrusting	leadership	and	an	overriding	requirement	to	close	with	the	enemy	and	impose	
his	will.	Beatty	did	not	consider	his	style	of	leadership	to	be	unintelligent	or	ignorant,	and	his	
reflective	professionalism	has	been	noted.
54
	He	was,	however,	overtly	anti-intellectual	and	was	not	
alone	in	so	being.	HMS	Dreadnought	attracted	the	hostility	of	this	faction,	which	did	not	accept	the	
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	A	wide-ranging	recent	source	is	James	A.	Yates,	The	Jutland	Controversy:	A	case	study	in	intra-service	politics,	
with	particular	reference	to	the	presentation	of	the	Battlecruiser	Fleet's	training,	conduct	and	command,	PhD	
thesis,	University	of	Hull,	1998.	
53
	In	the	Royal	Navy,	a	central	figure	in	the	Dreadnought-era	investigation	of	ship	(as	opposed	to	fleet)	tactics	is	
Admiral	Sir	William	May,	commander	of	the	Home	Fleet	1909-11	and	(while	C-in-C	at	Plymouth)	umpire	of	its	
exercises	in	1912-13.	Papers	in	MAY/10,	Caird	Library,	Greenwich,	show	detailed	understanding	of	how	big	
guns	and	increasing	ranges	emphasize	the	importance	of	plotting,	spotting	and	rate	change.	This	can	be	
contrasted	with	the	writings	of	old-schoolers	such	as	Adm	Sir	Cyprian	Bridge,	The	Art	of	Naval	Warfare:	
introductory	observations	(London,	1907),	or	Adm	Sir	R.	N.	Custance	(writing	anonymously	as	‘Barfleur'),	Naval	
Policy:	a	plea	for	the	study	of	war	(London,	1907),	who	stresses	the	need	for	concentration,	but	fails	to	
understand	that	the	long	range	of	big	guns	changes	the	way	this	is	best	achieved.	
54
	Lambert,	Admirals,	p.346.	
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sudden	strategic	and	tactical	shifts	it	necessitated.	Jellicoe	thus	represented	a	new	and	untested	
rationality,	and	in	his	command	role	faced	the	additional	burden	that	his	hard	thinking	about	the	
fleet	action	of	the	future	would	be	contested	and	in	some	powerful	quarters	disregarded.	
				Jellicoe’s	writings	before	Jutland	make	clear	his	careful	consideration	of	the	tactics	necessary	to	
bring	about	Lanchestrian	victory.	His	commitment	to	an	undivided	fleet	has	already	been	noted.	
Despite	his	well-known	apprehensions	concerning	the	danger	posed	by	torpedoes,	he	intended	to	
open	fire	at	medium	to	long	ranges	and	continue	doing	so	for	several	minutes	even	after	he	knew	
that	torpedoes	had	been	launched	against	him,	taking	advantage	of	their	slow	running	to	create	the	
crucial	few	minutes	of	unopposed	fire	before	evasive	action	became	necessary.
55
	He	also	
appreciated	that	long	ranges	and	high	speeds	made	full	control	of	his	fleet	essential,	both	to	
engineer	Lanchestrian	conditions	of	force	concentration,	and	to	extricate	the	fleet	intact	from	an	
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	Sumida,	in	‘A	Matter	of	Timing’	and	‘Expectation’,	believes	that	Jellicoe	sought	a	medium-range	battle,	while	
Seligmann,	‘A	German	preference?’,	contends	that	Jellicoe	was	well	aware	of	the	German	excellence	at	long-
range	shooting	and	sought	to	match	it.	Of	course	improvement	in	gunnery	was	rapid,	and	Jellicoe	would	have	
well	understood	that	neither	side	could	expect	to	have	perfect	knowledge	of	the	other’s	state	of	development.	
His	views	therefore	had	to	be	fluid.	He	clearly	understood	the	importance	of	opening	fire	at	the	longest	
possible	ranges	as	early	as	1906:	‘The	function	of	artillery	is	not	only	to	destroy	the	enemy	...	but	also	to	
prevent	the	development	of	his	power	by	doing	so	at	ranges	at	which	he	is	unable	to	make	an	effective	reply	
[Jellicoe's	emphasis].	…	It	is	curious	to	note	that	although	this	fact	has	been	long	recognised	in	shore	fighting	...	
it	has	never	until	recently	been	sufficiently	recognized	in	naval	warfare.	...	The	recent	development	of	the	
prospect	of	hitting	frequently	at	long	ranges	is	the	all-important	fact...'	(Jellicoe,	‘Considerations	of	the	Design	
of	a	Battleship’,	AL	252/4/8,	ALHRB).	During	the	war	we	may	note	the	subtle	shift		between	August	1914,	when	
he	wrote	that	‘deployment	at	long	range	may	give	us	the	initial	advantage	in	gunfire	it	is	so	important	to	
obtain,	but	there	can	be	no	doubt	that	we	must	gradually	close	the	range	to	obtain	decisive	results’	
(Addendum	to	Grand	Fleet	Battle	Instructions,	Jellicoe	Papers,	vol.1	,	item	38),	and	May	1916,	which	has	‘I	
attach	the	greatest	importance	to	making	full	use	of	the	fire	of	our	heavier	guns	in	the	early	stages	at	long	
range	…	the	range	should	be	between	15,000	and	10,000	yards,	the	latter	being	reached	as	the	enemy’s	fire	is	
overcome;	in	the	early	stages	of	an	action	I	do	not	desire	to	close	the	range	much	inside	14,000	yards’		(Grand	
Fleet	Battle	Orders,	Jellicoe	Papers,	vol.1,	item	225).	His	governing	principle	–	naturally	enough,	and	perfectly	
that	of	Fiske,	Baudry	and	Lanchester	–	was	that	‘our	system	must	be	that	which	…	will	enable	the	highest	rate	
of	accurate	fire’	(Jellicoe,		18/1/15,	`Remarks	on	the	use	of	director	firing	from	the	main	armament',	held	in	
ADM	137/1995,	National	Archives,	Kew,	and	cited	in	Sumida,	‘Expectation’).	
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engagement	without	danger	of	defeat	in	detail.
56
		As	noted	earlier,	concentration	of	fire	now	
required	not	massing	of	ships	but	rather	fleet	dispositions	which	guaranteed	concentration	of	
gunfire,	a	very	different	proposition	which	made	a	Nelsonian	emphasis	on	the	granting	of	great	
latitude	to	subordinates,		now	known	as	‘mission	command’,	peculiarly	inappropriate.			
				Indeed,	the	increased	certainty	of	geometric	firepower	concentration	over	melee	tactics	can	be	
quantified.	We	noted	earlier	that	symmetric	random	fragmentation	of	the	opposing	fleets	in	an	
otherwise-deterministic	Lanchestrian	battle	has	the	effect	of	randomizing	the	outcome.	For	
example,	splitting	each	fleet	into	two	(uniformly	distributed)	random	fragments,	while	it	does	not	
change	the	average	outcome,	has	the	effect	of	injecting	randomness	equivalent	to	a	standard	
deviation	(i.e.	typical	variation)	in	the	ratio	of	the	fleets’	numbers	of	16%,	and	thereby	a	typical	
variation	in	square-law	fighting	strengths	of	36%.	Put	simply,	allowing	such	division	creates	a	high	
degree	of	randomness,	which	can	easily	overturn	the	certainty	of	a	Lanchestrian	advantage.	At	their	
simplest,	the	tactical	imperatives	facing	Jellicoe	and	Scheer	are,	as	so	often,	best	captured	by	
Hughes:	‘A	major	part	of	skill	and	expertise	is	recognizing	and	avoiding	situations	dominated	by	
uncertainty	when	superior,	and	creating	opportunities	for	uncertainty	for	the	enemy	when	
inferior.’
57
	For	Jellicoe,	a	melee	would	have	randomised	his	perfect	Lanchestrian	battle.		For	Scheer,	
a	melee	against	part	of	the	Grand	Fleet	might	have	been	ideal.	
				Jellicoe	therefore	faced	a	tension	between	some	degree	of	certainty	about	the	correct	tactics	for	
employing	his	big	guns,	alongside	great	uncertainty	about	both	their	effectiveness	and	the	possible	
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	See	Goldrick,	Before	Jutland.	Historians	who	have	served	as	naval	officers	tend	to	place	greater	emphasis	on	
a	commander’s	remaining	in	full	control	of	his	fleet	than	do	civilian	historians	(Wayne	Hughes,	private	
communication).	
57
	Wayne	P.	Hughes,	‘Uncertainty	in	Combat’,	Military	Operations	Research,	1	(1994),	pp.	45-57.		Drax’s	essay	
in	BTY/7/2,	noted	above,	remains	equivocal	on	divisional	tactics.	He	understands	Fiske’s	principle	that	
‘concentration	requires	isolation’	(Fiske,	Fighting	Machine,	p263)	but	fails	to	reach	a	clear	view	on	whether	
such	concentration	requires	departure	from	line-ahead	tactics.	He	wants	divisions	to	be	able	to	exploit	
transient	opportunities	available	to	them,	but	knows	that	dividing	a	fleet	can	lead	to	defeat	in	detail,	a	stark	
conclusion	of	Fiske	and	Lanchester.	
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importance	of	the	mine	and	torpedo.
58
	The	actual	outcome	of	the	battle	would	not	necessarily	be	
the	most	probable	outcome,	and	Jellicoe’s	heavy	burden	of	responsibility	and	reflective	
temperament	dictated	a	cautious	appraisal	of	an	action	long	anticipated.	Blessed	with	a	telling	
margin	of	superiority	in	gun	power,	and	a	high	probability	of	victory	in	symmetrical	circumstances,	
Jellicoe	had	a	duty	to	be	wary	of	any	factor	that	might	move	the	balance	of	probability	in	favour	of	
his	opposite	number:	and	in	the	deployment	of	ever	more	powerful	modern	weaponry	in	the	
cramped	confines	of	the	North	Sea,	such	dangers	were	many.		In	this	light,	Jellicoe’s	famous	turn	
away	from	Scheer	after	crossing	the	‘T’	makes	greater	sense.	The	standard	view	of	Jellicoe’s	critics	is	
that	he	should	have	turned	towards	the	High	Seas	Fleet,	perhaps	losing	a	few	battleships	wounded	
by	torpedoes,	but	accepting	such	losses	in	pursuit	of	victory.		But	these	wounded	ships	could	easily	
have	crippled	the	Grand	Fleet’s	perfect	line	and	thereby	denied	him	the	conditions	essential	for	that	
victory.	
	
IV	
Despite	a	number	of	naval	actions	in	1914,	the	tactics	of	the	dreadnought	clash	were	first	put	the	
test	at	Dogger	Bank	in	January	1915,	when	British	and	German	battlecruisers	met.	This	skirmish	is	of	
significant	interest,	as	it	is	on	many	levels	a	small-scale	precursor	to	the	opening	‘Run	to	the	South’	
of	the	Jutland	Battle.	It	reveals	to	us	both	the	tactics	chosen	by	Beatty	and	Hipper	and	the	relative	
merits	of	the	ships.		
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	Uncertain	discussion	of	torpedo	tactics	pervades	the	literature	before	Jutland.	For	example,	within	one	
journal,	the	Proceedings	of	the	US	Naval	Institute,	one	has:	V.	Cuniberti	trans.	T.	Withers	Jr,	‘All	torpedoes!’,	
PUSNI,	40	(1914),	pp.	27-31,	advocating	a	fleet	of	small	semi-submersible	torpedo	boats;	Lt	R.	A.	Dawes,	‘Battle	
Tactics’,	PUSNI,	41	(1915),	pp.	1873-1895,	offering	a	turn	away	(but	not	towards)	as	a	fleet	tactic	when	under	
torpedo	attack;	and	H.	H.	Frost,	‘The	problem	of	firing	at	a	fleet	under	way	with	long-range	torpedoes’,	PUSNI,	
39	(1913),	pp.	681-698.	Perhaps	the	final	word	should	go	to	Lt	Chester	W.	Nimitz,	‘Military	value	and	tactics	of	
modern	submarines’,	PUSNI,	38	(1912),	pp.	1193-1211:	‘The	steady	development	of	the	torpedo	[and	the]	
submarine	…	will	result	in	a	most	dangerous	offensive	weapon,	…	which	will	have	a	large	part	in	deciding	fleet	
actions.’	
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				Dogger	Bank	is	usually	considered	to	be	an	opportunity	for	decisive	British	victory,
59
	lost	only	by	
an	untimely	signal	from	Ralph	Seymour	in	the	disabled	Lion.	The	contemporary	accounts	are	
strikingly	triumphal,	but	the	later	experience	of	Jutland	suggests	this	attitude	to	be	misplaced.	Had	
the	three	engaged	ships	–	Tiger,	Princess	Royal	and	New	Zealand	–	continued	against	the	three	
remaining	German	ships,	a	successful	result	was	unlikely	for	a	number	of	reasons.
60
		
				The	standard	of	gunnery	in	the	BCF	was	known	to	be	well	below	that	of	the	Grand	Fleet.	There	
were	no	facilities	for	gunnery	training	at	Rosyth	and	these	could	only	be	provided	when	BCF	
divisions	were	sent	in	rotation	to	the	Grand	Fleet	base	at	Scapa	Flow.	Nor	was	Beatty	inclined	to	
emphasize	accurate	gunnery.	His	view	was	that	rate	of	fire	was	more	important,	and	thus	safety	
features	that	might	have	reduced	this	were	disregarded,	creating	the	danger,	later	revealed	at	
Jutland,	of	a	turret	penetration	transmitting	explosive	fire	to	the	ships’	magazines	with	catastrophic	
results.
61
		The	Germans,	by	contrast,	are	considered	to	have	learned	much	from	the	battle	in	this	
respect,	due	to	the	fortuitous	escape	of	Seydlitz	from	a	flash	explosion	not	unlike	Lion’s	near-miss	16	
months	later.	It	is	also	now	accepted	that	British	powder	was	much	more	combustible	than	German,	
placing	a	premium	on	stringent	measures	to	limit	the	transmission	of	flash	explosions.	
				Even	had	British	ammunition	handling	procedures	been	impeccable,	the	older	British	
battlecruisers	were	rendered	as	obsolescent	as	the	hapless	Blücher	in	their	scouting	role	by	the	
appearance	of	the	new	German	battlecruisers	with	heavier	armour	and	similar	armament.	Of	the	
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	Hughes,	Fleet	Tactics,	p75;	Capt	J.	Cresswell,	Royal	Naval	Staff	College	lecture	(1932),	Churchill	Archives	
Centre	CRES	3/2	
60
	A	quantitative	study	by	the	authors	using	modern	Bayesian	methods	is	Niall	MacKay,	Christopher	Price	and	
A.	Jamie	Wood,	‘Weighing	the	Fog	of	War:	Illustrating	the	power	of	Bayesian	methods	for	historical	analysis	
through	the	Battle	of	the	Dogger	Bank’,	to	appear	in	Historical	Methods.	
61
	The	exchange	between	Jellicoe	and	Beatty	of	November	1915	makes	clear	the	difference	in	their	views:	
Jellicoe	writes	‘I	fear	the	rapidity	idea	was	carried	to	excess’,		Beatty	replies	‘I	feel	very	strongly	[that]	we	
should	endeavour	to	quicken	up	our	firing’,	and	Jellicoe	explains	that	‘I	am	all	for	rapiodity	of	fire,	but	my	only	
fear	is	that	ships	may	break	into	rapid	fire	too	soon’.	Jellicoe	Papers,	vol.1,	items	172-174.	
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three	ships	pursuing	the	German	battlecruisers,	the	armour	of	New	Zealand	could	not	have	
withstood	the	concentrated	fire	of	German	11”	and	12”	guns	at	medium	range.	Finally	all	
shortcomings	were	compounded	by	poor	fire	distribution,	which	left	Moltke	unmolested	when	Tiger	
mistakenly	concentrated	on	Seydlitz.	This	was	a	deadly	mistake	as	the	gunnery	of	even	German	
battlecruisers	deteriorated	sharply	when	under	fire,	in	contrast	to	their	excellent	performance	when	
not	engaged.	This	error	was	repeated	at	Jutland,	when	Derfflinger	was	not	taken	under	fire	and	
doubled	up	with	Seydlitz	on	Queen	Mary.		
				Tactically,	it	is	clear	from	this	battle	that	Beatty	had	failed	to	comprehend	key	ideas	from	pre-war	
tactics:	the	simultaneous	engagement	of	the	fleet,	positioning	of	flagship,	and	use	of	speed	and	
greater	gun	range	to	secure	unmolested	firing,	Fiske	and	Baudry’s	five	minutes.	The	first,	especially,	
would	come	back	to	haunt	the	BCF	in	the	early	stages	of	the	Jutland	encounter.						
				The	outcome	of	Dogger	Bank	might	seem	to	presage	a	catastrophe	for	the	Royal	Navy.	The	
chances	of	the	German	High	seas	Fleet	encountering	the	overconfident	BCF	in	isolation	and	exposing	
its	weaknesses	were	high	and	the	Germans	executed	just	such	a	plan	when	they	put	to	sea	on	May	
31	1916.	Previous	attempts	to	achieve	this	result	had	been	frustrated	by	circumstance	and	the	
timidity	of	Admirals	Pohl	and	Ingenohl,	who	were	reluctant	to	risk	the	High	Seas	Fleet	except	in	
overwhelmingly	favourable	conditions,	and	had	reason	to	fear	the	wrath	of	the	Kaiser	if	they	did.	
The	new	and	aggressive	commander	of	the	High	Seas	Fleet,	Scheer,	succeeded	in	his	primary	aim	of	
drawing	the	BCF	out	of	Rosyth,	but	the	initial	dispositions	suggested	a	German	rather	than	a	British	
disaster.	
				Jellicoe	was	aware	of	the	German	plan	through	interception	of	cracked	German	communications,	
and	put	to	sea	to	rendezvous	with	the	BCF	and	surprise	Scheer	with	the	concentrated	Grand	Fleet.	A	
chance	factor	also	unhinged	the	German	plan,	as	the	3
rd
	Battlecruiser	Squadron	[3BCS]	had	been	
detached	to	Scapa	Flow	for	gunnery	practice	and	temporarily	replaced	at	Rosyth	by	the	5
th
	Battle	
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Squadron,	[5BS]	consisting	of	four	of	the	five	new	Queen	Elizabeth	class	battleships,	easily	the	most	
powerful	warships	at	sea	on	the	day.	Apart	from	generic	faults	in	British	shells,	they	possessed	none	
of	the	shortcomings	of	the	battlecruisers	to	which	they	were	attached,	particularly	in	terms	of	
accurate	gunnery.	
				The	German	plan	was	to	meet	Beatty	with	the	High	Seas	Fleet’s	battlecruisers	under	Hipper	and	
draw	them	on	to	the	approaching	High	Seas	Fleet	for	destruction.	The	unsuspecting	Hipper,	
however,	with	five	battle	cruisers	seemed	destined	to	meet	ten	British	capital	ships.	In	such	
circumstances	the	Square	Law	promised	an	inevitable	result.	The	encounter	would	be	symmetrical,	
in	Lanchestrian	terms,	but	of	course	this	did	not	mean	an	even	contest.	British	ships	armed	with	15”	
and	13.5”	guns	could	engage	Hipper’s	11”	ships	beyond	effective	range	of	their	own	main	
armaments	and	he	would	have	no	prospect	of	concentrating	his	12”	fire	on	the	weaker	British	
vessels	before	his	fighting	power	was	eliminated.	Nor	would	he	have	time	to	retreat	on	to	the	HSF	
before	being	destroyed,	as	his	ships	were	slower	than	the	enemy	battlecruisers,	and	almost	matched	
by	5BS	
					However,	the	different	phases	of	the	battle	produced	aspects	of	the	extremes	desired	by	both	
sides.	The	weaknesses	in	Beatty’s	signalling	displayed	at	Dogger	Bank	were	repeated	and,	in	his	
eagerness	to	get	at	Hipper,	he	left	5BS	behind.	His	poor	deployment	of	5BS	far	to	his	rear	created	a	
third	subdivision	of	the	Grand	Fleet.	This	made	possible	Hipper’s	survival	and	presented	him	with	an	
opportunity.	Though	Hipper	was	unable	to	avoid	battle,	and	even	without	5BS	the	Square	Law	
suggested	a	negative	outcome	for	his	five	battecruisers	against	Beatty’s	six,	circumstances	favoured	
him.		Beatty’s	ships	closed	to	within	the	effective	range	of	German	guns	before	opening	fire,	and	
though	this	resulted	from	poor	visibility	rather	than	calculation,	the	effect	was	to	place	his	long-
armed	but	thin-skinned	force	of	battlecruisers	in	unnecessary	danger.	Poor	fire	distribution	left	
Derfflinger	unmolested	and	enabled	Hipper	to	achieve	moments	of	effective	numerical	superiority	in	
the	ragged	running	fight	which	developed	when	the	battlecruisers	met.		These	circumstances	
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suggested	the	elimination	of	Beatty’s	force,	in	the	first	place	because	the	Square	Law	would	not	
function	to	his	advantage,	and	then	after	the	immediate	loss	of	Indefatigable	(Fig.1,	point	A)	because	
it	would	start	to	work	against	him.	However,	unlike	Hipper,	the	speed	of	his	vessels	gave	him	the	
option	of	disengagement.	
				The	dynamics	of	this	process	are	clear	from	Figure	1,	with	Beatty	failing	to	achieve	concentration,	
and	thereby	a	favourable	gunfire	ratio,	during	the	first	twenty	minutes.	When	5BS	closed	the	range	
sufficiently	to	engage	(Fig.1,	B),	the	BCF	finally	achieved	concentration	and	Hipper	was	placed	in	
apparently	mortal	peril.	Beatty	was	able	to	open	the	range	between	his	battlecruisers	and	those	of	
the	enemy,	reducing	the	effectiveness	of	their	smaller	main	armament,	while	5BS	engaged	Hipper’s	
force	effectively	at	such	range	that	they	had	no	means	of	reply.	However,	5BS	at	this	stage	could	
only	engage	the	rear	of	Hipper’s	line	and,	unpleasant	though	this	was	for	Moltke	and	Von	der	Tann,	
Hipper’s	newest	and	most	powerful	vessels	Lützow	and	Derfflinger,	with	12”	guns	along	the	
centreline,	were	still	in	action	with	Beatty.		
				The	loss	of	Queen	Mary	to	an	explosion	occurred	at	this	point	of	the	battle	(Fig.1,	C).	The	
importance	of	Derfflinger's	escape	from	British	fire	at	the	outset	of	the	battle	has	been	dismissed	on	
the	grounds	of	the	German	ship's	poor	initial	shooting,
62
	but	she	had	still	not	been	hit	when	credited	
with	the	fatal	salvo	against	Queen	Mary,	firing	in	conjunction	with	Seydlitz,	and	had	not	suffered	the	
sharply	degrading	effects	of	battle	damage	on	her	fire	control.	Even	without	the	explosion,	the	
Square	Law	suggested	a	catastrophic	result	for	the	British	battlecruiser	in	this	unequal	exchange.	
With	5BS	in	action,	however,	the	undergunning	of	the	German	11”	ships	promised	to	be	the	decisive	
weakness	on	either	side	if	this	action	were	to	continue.	Von	der	Tann	particularly	began	to	suffer	
immediate	and	severe	damage.	In	fact,	the	arrival	of	Scheer	and	the	rest	of	the	High	Seas	Fleet	
(Fig.1,	D)	brought	the	‘Run	to	the	South’	phase	of	the	battle	to	a	close	and	turned	the	tables	again.		
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				Beatty	was	now	decisively	outnumbered	and	his	only	option	was	to	reverse	course	and	seek	union	
with	the	Grand	Fleet.	This	was	also	his	duty	as	he	had	in	effect	succeeded	in	his	scouting	role	and	
located	the	enemy	fleet.		The	phase	of	the	battle	known	as	the	‘Run	to	the	North’	thus	began,	
though	not	quite	yet	for	the	Queen	Elizabeths	of	5BS,	which	still	on	a	southward	course	passed	
Beatty’s	ships	heading	north,	waiting	anxiously	for	the	order	to	execute	a	delayed	signal	to	turn	
(Fig.1,	E).		When	this	arrived	each	ship	of	5BS	turned	in	sequence	and	faced	the	concentrated	fire	
alone	while	turning,	creating	a	situation	which	these	uniquely	valuable	vessels	should	never	have	
faced	and	in	which	the	Germans	might	again	have	achieved	their	desired	risk-fleet	result.	Once	again	
Beatty’s	failure	to	understand	the	Lanchestrian	dynamic	is	starkly	visible	in	Figure	1,	where	between	
points	D	and	F	we	observe	a	reversal	of	the	gunfire	ratio	in	the	Germans’	favour,	the	only	period	of	
the	battle	during	which	this	was	achieved.	Catastrophe	was	avoided,	however,	and	5BS	was	able	to	
stay	ahead	of	the	pursuing	enemy,	absorb	a	number	of	hits	and	damage	enemy	vessels	with	
effective	gunnery,	before	action	was	broken	off	(Fig.1,	F).		
					In	both	phases	of	the	scouting	duel,	the	Germans	enjoyed	a	visibility	advantage,	with	the	British	
ships	outlined	against	the	setting	sun	while	their	own	were	concealed	in	the	murk	to	the	East.	
However,	in	the	Run	to	the	North,	the	duel	between	Hipper	and	Beatty	continued	and	in	stark	
contrast	to	the	Run	to	the	South	Beatty	had	the	better	of	it.	Beatty	was	now	much	more	careful	to	
use	his	superior	speed,	increasingly	apparent	as	the	Germans’	inferior	brown	coal	took	its	toll,	to	
dictate	the	range	of	engagement	for	his	battlecruisers,	while	Valiant	and	Barham	of	5BS	scored	
repeatedly	against	Hipper’s	ships.		Though	the	results	of	this	continuing	engagement	were	
undramatic,	they	suggest	the	likely	outcome	had	Beatty	deployed	wisely	in	the	run	to	the	south	with	
his	full	force.	Beatty,	however,	now	achieved	success	by	delivering	the	unsuspecting	High	Seas	Fleet	
onto	Jellicoe’s	guns,	again	reversing	the	advantage.	
				When	the	battle	fleets	met	(Fig.1,	G),	Jellicoe	having	successfully	deployed	in	battle	line	to	port,	an	
ideal	Lanchestrian	positional	situation	was	created	in	which	the	High	Seas	Fleet	would	normally	be	
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destroyed	(Fig.1,	H,	at	1830).	Again	poor	visibility	favoured	the	Germans	enough	to	save	them,	for	
although	the	orientation	of	the	fleets	relative	to	the	setting	sun	was	reversed	in	favour	of	the	British,	
general	visibility	by	this	time	was	patchy	and	in	places	reduced	almost	to	zero,	negating	Jellicoe’s	
numerical	advantage	and	momentarily	reversing	it	when	Invincible,	ranging	with	3BCS	ahead	of	
Jellicoe	was	suddenly	exposed	by	a	change	in	the	light.	This	misfortune	led,	as	with	Queen	Mary,	to	
adverse	Square	Law	concentration	in	which	she	was	exposed	(a	few	minutes	after	Fig.1,	G)	to	the	fire	
of	two	German	ships,	Lützow	firing	the	salvo	resulting	in	Invincible’s	fatal	explosion	(at	point	H	in	
Fig.1).	Nevertheless,	the	accuracy	of	the	shooting	of	3BCS	was	clearly	improved	by	their	training	at	
Scapa	Flow,	and	Invincible	is	credited	with	inflicting	fatal	damage	on	Lützow	before	her	demise.	Thus	
the	oldest	battlecruiser	and	the	newest	present	at	the	battle	effectively	sank	each	other.	
				Confronted	with	the	concentrated	Grand	Fleet,	Scheer	had	no	option	but	flight.	He	successfully	
executed	the	battle	turn	away	practised	for	such	an	occasion	(Fig.1,	I),	aided	by	poor	visibility	which	
prevented	at	least	half	of	the	Grand	Fleet’s	battleships	from	engaging,
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		and	vanished	into	the	murk	
before	turning	and	blundering	into	Jellicoe	again	(Fig.1,	J,	at	1900).	The	turn	away	then	had	to	be	
repeated,	but	was	‘a	shambles’	compared	to	the	first	attempt:	on	this	second	occasion,	visibility	was	
better	for	the	British,	many	more	of	Jellicoe’s	ships	found	targets,	and	the	manoeuvre	was	poorly	
executed	under	heavy	fire	(Fig.1,	K,	not	sharply	defined).	At	this	point,	the	Square	Law	‘was	
beginning	to	tip	the	High	Seas	Fleet	down	a	steepening	slope	to	oblivion’,
64
	but	the	disarray	of	
Scheer’s	ships	was	ultimately	masked	by	the	laying	of	smoke,	a	well-executed	destroyer	attack	on	
the	Grand	Fleet	forcing	a	turn	away,	and	a	sacrificial	charge	by	his	battlecruisers.	In	this	‘death	
charge’	on	the	British	fleet,	further	poor	visibility	saved	Hipper’s	ships	from	extended	punishment	
and	enabled	them	to	escape,	but	in	a	rare	clash	of	the	newest	vessels	Derfflinger		was		‘shattered’,	
primarily	by	the	new	15”	battleship	Revenge,	losing	two	of	her	four	turrets	in	a	matter	of	
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moments.
65
	In	better	conditions,	neither	of	Scheer’s	about	turns	would	have	saved	him	if	conducted	
in	full	view	of	the	concentrated	Grand	Fleet.	Nevertheless,	the	point	of	decision	had	been	reached	
and	Jellicoe	had,	in	strategic	terms,	won.
66
	No	bright	prospect	other	than	escape	remained	to	
Scheer,	and	he	later	crept	past	Jellicoe	in	the	dark.	
	
	
V	
The	British	capital	ships	lost	at	Jutland	were	all	battlecruisers.	Two	of	the	three	lost	were	among	
Britain’s	oldest	vessels	of	this	type,	less	well	protected	and	armed	than	later	ships:	the	real	shock	
was	the	loss	of	the	new	Queen	Mary,	which	can	nevertheless	be	matched	against	the	equally	
valuable	Lützow	despite	much	heavier	loss	of	life	on	the	British	ship.	There	is	little	evidence	to	point	
to	systemic	weakness	in	British	ship	design	and	doctrine	in	the	context	of	dreadnought	encounters.	
Shortcomings	relate	more	to	the	habits	of	the	BCF	and	Beatty’s	idiosyncratic	leadership,	all	of	which	
had	been	on	display	at	Dogger	Bank.	
				Apart	from	this,	sources	agree	that	British	cordite	was	much	more	likely	to	explode	than	German,	
and	that	if	both	fleets	had	been	equipped	with	the	British	propellant	at	least	one	German	capital	
ship	would	have	met	the	same	fate.	However,	catastrophic	explosion	required	a	fire	or	cordite	
detonation	reaching	a	main	magazine,	and	the	evidence	of	the	battle	was	that	such	a	fate	was	by	no	
means	overwhelmingly	probable	in	British	ships.	All	the	British	losses	involved	a	shell	penetrating	a	
gun	turret,	causing	a	cordite	fire	which	transmitted	itself	to	a	main	magazine	and	triggered	a	
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catastrophic	explosion.	Only	a	fraction	of	German	hits	could	be	expected	to	hit	a	turret,	and	a	
smaller	fraction	to	penetrate.	Lion	was	hit	13	times	by	the	12”	shells	of	Lützow	in	addition	to	the	
near-fatal	turret	hit,	and	Tiger	was	hit	13	times	without	seeming	likely	to	sink.	Among	turret	hits,	not	
all	would	cause	catastrophe,	which	was	preventable	by	alert	fire	control	and	flooding	of	magazines	
as	on	Lion.	Queen	Mary	exploded	some	time	after	being	hit,	implying,	for	whatever	reason,	
unsuccessful	fire	fighting	and	damage	control.		
				If	the	probability	of	a	catastrophic	hit	from	a	single	shell	was	very	low,	German	chances	of	
inflicting	such	a	blow	would	obviously	be	increased	if	more	guns	could	be	brought	to	bear	on	the	
target.	When	outnumbered,	German	guns	were	less	likely	to	score	a	turret	hit	than	British,	but	the	
different	phases	of	the	fighting	at	Jutland	provided	occasions	when	this	was	not	so.	Queen	Mary	and	
Indefatigable	were	lost	when	the	former	was	fired	on	exclusively	by	more	than	one	German	ship	for	
a	period	of	time	and	the	latter	when	she	became	detached	from	the	line.	Similarly,	Invincible,	though	
in	the	van	of	the	Grand	Fleet,	was	two	miles	ahead	of	it	when	fatally	hit	facing	odds	of	2-1	in	chance	
conditions	of	suddenly	improved	visibility	for	the	Germans.	
				It	is	usually	assumed	that	the	battlecruisers’	adopted	role	as	a	fast	wing	of	the	Grand	Fleet	was	a	
mistake	which	placed	them	in	mortal	danger.	However,	if	they	had	met	the	Germans	as	part	of	the	
Grand	Fleet	in	line	of	battle	their	chances	of	survival	would	have	been	greater	than	when	skirmishing	
with	German	battlecruisers.	A	heavily	outnumbered	German	fleet	could	not	have	expected	to	
concentrate	the	weight	of	fire	on	any	one	battlecruiser	that	they	actually	achieved	at	Jutland,	and	at	
the	outset	of	action	a	number	of	British	ships	would	have	received	no	fire	at	all,	most	likely	those	
which	overlapped	the	German	line	at	either	end,	where	the	battlecruisers	expected	to	be	stationed.		
				A	further	factor	working	against	the	Germans	was	that	their	prospects	of	achieving	catastrophic	
hits,	although	slim,	were	greatest	at	the	outset	of	battle.	Jellicoe	was	consistent	in	his	view	that	the	
first	five	minutes	of	fire	were	likely	to	be	decisive,	no	doubt	influenced	by	his	reading	of	pre-war	
35	
	
material.
67
	Though	German	ships	could	remain	afloat	after	sustaining	enormous	damage	their	utility	
in	a	fleet	encounter	would	cease	when	the	last	of	their	main	armament	was	silenced.	This	would	
occur	at	an	increasing	rate	as	the	battle	progressed	with	a	concomitant	reduction	in	their	capacity	to	
inflict	equivalent	damage	on	the	British.	The	rate	and	effectiveness	of	the	fire	of	German	
battlecruisers	also	degraded	rapidly	as	the	vessels	received	hits,	whether	or	not	they	penetrated	the	
armour:	the	kinetic	energy	imparted	by	the	impact	of	the	large	British	shells	was	considerable,	
producing	a	shock	effect	on	the	crew	and	degrading	the	effectiveness	of	sensitive	fire	control	
equipment.
68
	In	this	context,	the	failure	of	the	BCF	to	engage	the	new	and	dangerous	Derfflinger	
early	in	the	battle	was	a	grave	error.	Generally	inaccurate	shooting	by	the	BCF	also	handed	Hipper	
the	early	initiative,	stressing	again	the	value	of	the	‘first	five	minutes’.	
				Thus	none	of	the	apparent	weaknesses	of	British	ships	relative	to	German	was	likely	to	affect	
decisively	a	broadside-to-broadside	encounter	of	the	battle	fleets.	The	strengths	resulting	from	
earlier	decisions,	chiefly	in	terms	of	numerical	superiority	in	ships,	guns	and	gun	calibre,	were	much	
more	important.	In	Lanchestrian	terms,	German	success	would	have	to	be	achieved	through	their	
longed-for	Kraftausgleich.		They	put	to	sea	on	31
st
	May	1916	with	precisely	this	intention,	and	during	
that	day	and	the	following	night	the	Lanchestrian	balance	shifted	fluidly	between	the	opposing	sides,	
more	than	once	changing	radically	within	seconds	as	each	sought	to	achieve	a	Clausewitzian	point	of	
decision	[Schwerpunkt].	
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VI	
From	a	Lanchestrian	perspective	both	sides	flirted	with	disaster	at	various	stages	of	the	Battle	of	
Jutland.	However,	the	Germans	achieved	a	three	to	one	advantage	in	dreadnoughts	sunk,	and	more	
importantly	escaped	extermination.	This	result	seemed	to	defy	Lanchestrian	probability	as	it	was	
understood	at	the	time.	Each	of	Scheer’s	massive	blunders	was	an	unforced	error	which	would	have	
cost	him	his	fleet	had	not	random	factors	involving	weather	and	circumstantial	British	deployments	
developed	exactly	as	they	did	on	the	day.			
				When	the	fleets	set	sail,	the	forewarned	British	in	advance	of	Scheer,	the	most	probable	outcome	
was	the	destruction	of	Hipper’s	battlecruisers	by	the	reinforced	BCF,	possibly	for	the	loss	of	one	or	
two	British	battlecruisers,	but	with	the	firepower	of	5BS	ensuring	British	predominance.	After	this,	
Scheer	would	necessarily	have	returned	to	port	with	all	hope	of	a	future	challenge	to	the	Grand	
Fleet	abandoned.	Beatty’s	weaknesses,	and	those	he	tolerated	in	his	subordinates,	threw	away	this	
favourable	situation	and	for	a	time	offered	the	Germans	exactly	the	limited	yet	portentous	victory	
they	sought.	However,	Beatty’s	unstable	dynamic	produced	a	still	less	probable	event:	a	clash	of	the	
fleets	in	which	Scheer	could	not	prevail.	Taken	as	a	whole,	however,	the	battle	produced	at	the	
strategic	level	exactly	the	outcome	that	Lanchester’s	logic	would	predict.	The	full	Lanchestrian	
battle,	with	its	certain	defeat,	must	always	be	declined	by	the	numerically-inferior	force.
69
		
				The	25	British	dreadnought	battleships	of	less	than	15"	main	armament	were	not	everything	that	
could	be	desired	but,	in	mounting	127	turrets	of	twin	guns	of	at	least	12”	calibre,	they	nevertheless	
provided	a	fleet-in-being	large	enough,	by	a	narrow	margin,	to	deter	any	German	thought	of	
engaging	in	a	full	fleet	action	without	previous	attempts	at	partial	attrition.	This	was	in	itself	a	
decisive	strategic	result,	but	must	be	considered	a	bluff	if	British	ships	were	markedly	inferior	to	
their	German	equivalents.	Evidence	suggests	that	this	was	not	the	case.	British	build	quality	per	unit	
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which	was	deliberately	less	than	optimal,	especially	in	speed	and	armour,	was	offset	by	incremental	
improvement,	superior	numbers	and	gunpower:		the	culminating	vessels	in	the	British	production	
process,	the	Queen	Elizabeths,	were	outstanding	vessels	by	any	standard.	
				Judgements	of	the	technical	qualities	of	opposing	ships	should	also	recognise	that	the	British	and	
German	fleets	were	engaged	in	a	process	of	technological	leapfrog	during	a	period	of	extraordinarily	
swift	development,	and	on	occasions	such	as	Jutland	vessels	produced	in	the	early	part	of	the	period	
could	find	themselves	outclassed	when	encountering	newer	vessels.		At	Jutland	the	British	fielded	six	
battleships	in	the	ultimate	dreadnought	configuration	of	fore	and	aft	turrets	along	the	centreline,	to	
two	German	battlecruisers	of	the	same	type,	one	of	which	was	lost.		As	might	be	expected,	Lützow	
and	Derfflinger	were	deadly	opponents	to	other	battlecruisers	and	older	dreadnought	battleships,	
but	when	Derfflinger	encountered	Revenge,	the	battleship	overpowered	the	battlecruiser	in	a	match	
of	generationally-compatible	vessels	in	which	Derfflinger’s	limited	main	armament	was	not	
effectively	offset	by	enhanced	armour.	In	sum,	the	Germans	were	outnumbered	and	at	least	
matched	in	technological	terms	by	the	Grand	Fleet,	and	this	being	the	case	tactics	became	of	
paramount	importance.		
				Thus	the	adverse	balance	of	British	losses	indicated	not	overall	weakness	but	rather	that	Jutland	
was	the	great	Lanchestrian	battle	that	never	quite	happened,	as	Scheer	was	twice	able	to	decline	its	
culmination	when	he	knew	himself	to	be	moments	from	destruction.		Nevertheless,	at	the	
operational	and	tactical	levels	the	battle	still	respected	a	Lanchestrian	dynamic,	as	the	shifting	fight	
between	squadrons	and	ships	produced	moments	of	battle	when	concentration	was	realized	and	the	
resulting	advantages	accrued,	broadly	favouring	the	Germans.	The	costly	British	victory	at	Jutland	is,	
therefore,	best	understood	in	Lanchestrian	terms	as	a	race	for	concentration	which	Jellicoe	
ultimately	won.	Although	this	was	not	converted	into	German	ships	sunk,	and	critics	on	both	sides	
were	quick	to	contrast	Jutland	with	Trafalgar,	the	effect	on	the	enemy’s	will	to	fight	was	much	the	
same	and	Jellicoe’s	actions	and	his	understanding	of	his	situation	must	be	considered	sound.		
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				Jutland	should	therefore	be	seen	as	a	victory	shaped	from	1905	to	1916	by	a	developing	but	
integrated	vision	of	fleet	policy	and	tactics	which	enabled	Fisher’s	programme	of	perpetual	
technological	advance	to	be	carried	through	to	strategic	success.	Essential	to	this	was	numerical	
superiority,	dictated	by	the	crux	of	Lanchester’s	argument,	the	quantification	of	the	trade-off	
between	numbers	and	quality.
70
	The	Royal	Navy,	for	all	its	flaws,	was	a	learning	organization,	in	
which	reforming	drive	was	balanced	by	technocratic	experts	making	finely-balanced	decisions	in	a	
rational	manner	through	a	period	of	intense	technological	and	tactical	change.	It	got	the	big	
decisions	right,	building	and	correctly	wielding	its	decisive	weapon,	the	Grand	Fleet,	to	achieve	the	
required	strategic	victory.	
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	Ironically	Lanchester’s	anticipator	Bradley	Fiske	missed	this	point	when	he	wrote	in	1920	that	‘the	German	
navy	was	the	better,	and	was	vanquished	merely	because	it	was	the	smaller’.	B.	A.	Fiske,	review	of	Jellicoe,	
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